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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Final Judgment was entered on December 5, 2002 [Addendum ("Add.") A
hereto, Record on Appeal ("R.") 2359-2361]. Plaintiff timely filed its notice of appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court on December 27, 2002 (R. 2375-2378), pursuant to Utah R.
App. P. 4(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). The Utah Supreme Court transferred
this appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court erred in directing a verdict in favor
of defendants on plaintiff's claims for lost profits, without letting the jury consider
plaintiff's evidence that its net profits equaled its gross profits.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant, the appellate court views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Directed verdicts are reversed when the evidence, viewed in this
fashion, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. Nay v.
General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993).
Preservation of Issue: Trial Transcript ("Tr."), R. 2427-2431,
pp. 405-411; R. 1301-1319
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff s claim
that defendants violated the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann.
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§§ 32A~lla-101, et seq., on grounds basis that plaintiffs claim impermissibly sought to
apply the Act retroactively.
Standard of Review: Whether a statute is being applied retroactively is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, % 37, 40
P.3d611.
Preservation of Issue: Tr. 416; R. 702-711
Issue No. 3: Whether the district court committed reversible error in
excluding evidence that Carlson's sales of Squatters beer were much greater than the
sales occurring after the termination of the Distribution Agreement between the parties
("Distribution Agreement" or "Agreement") and the appointment of a new distributor,
on grounds that this evidence was irrelevant to whether plaintiff used its best efforts to
market and distribute defendants' beer, as required by the Agreement.
Standard of Review: Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law
that is reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781,
n.3 (Utah 1991).1 An erroneous evidentiary ruling will be reversed if, absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. Ortiz v.
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah App. 1997).
Preservation of Issue: R. 1409-1424

Although there are a number of other Utah cases indicating that it is within the
discretion of the trial judge to determine relevance, including the Ortiz case cited
below, fn. 3 of Ramirez is the better reasoned approach.
-2-

Issue No. 4: Whether the district court erred in arbitrarily awarding plaintiff
pre-judgment interest on an amount of less than the full amount of the termination fee
awarded to plaintiff by the jury for defendants' breach of the Distribution Agreement,
where it was undisputed that the amount of the termination fee was calculable with
mathematical certainty at the time of defendants' breach.
Standard of Review: Whether to award pre-judgment interest is a
question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah
App. 5, 1 2 3 , 994P.2d817.
Preservation of Issue: R. 1962-1970, 2332-2339; Transcript of
October 30, 2002 hearing ("10-30-02 Tr."), R. 2432.
Issue No. 5: Whether the district court erred in finding that plaintiff was not
the prevailing party in this action under the Distribution Agreement, for purposes of
awarding attorney fees and costs, despite the fact that plaintiff was awarded a net
judgment of over $324,000.00 against defendants.
Standard of Review: Whether a party is the prevailing party in an
action for breach of a contract is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nielson Co., v. Cook, 2002
UT 11, t 2 5 , 4 0 P . 3 d 1119.
Preservation of Issue: R. 1971-2132, 2316-2324; 10-30-02 Tr.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson")
against defendants Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. ("SLBC"), and Utah Brewers
Cooperative, L.C. ("UBC"), based on defendants' breach of a Distribution Agreement.
Pursuant to the Distribution Agreement, Carlson was the exclusive distributor of
Squatters beer in Salt Lake and Tooele Counties, and portions of Wasatch, Summit,
Utah, and Davis Counties, Utah. Squatters beer is a micro-brew beer brewed by
SLBC, which merged into UBC, SLBC's successor in interest under the Distribution
Agreement (R. 451-487).
Carlson filed its Complaint on August 4, 2000, and alleged three causes of
action: (1) breach of contract arising from defendants' wrongful, premature termination
of the Distribution Agreement; (2) violation of Carlson's trademark rights regarding
Squatters beer under the Distribution Agreement; and (3) injunctive relief requiring
defendants to reinstate the Distribution Agreement for its unexpired term (i.e., through
December 14, 2000). (R. 1-36) On February 16, 2001, Carlson filed an Amended
Complaint to add a fourth cause of action, alleging that defendants' wrongful
termination of the Distribution Agreement also violated the Utah Beer Industry
Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 32A-lla-101, et seq. ("Distribution Act")(R. 451487; Add. H hereto).
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In addition to damages and injunctive relief, Carlson sought payment of a
termination fee required of defendants upon premature termination of the Distribution
Agreement, and attorney fees and costs as provided for in the Agreement, and in the
Distribution Act (R. 451-487). Defendants denied breaching the Distribution
Agreement and violating the Distribution Act, and denied owing Carlson a termination
fee. Defendants also counterclaimed, alleging that Carlson breached the Distribution
Agreement by failing to use its best efforts in distributing Squatters beer, and seeking
damages for the alleged breach. Defendants also contended that if a termination fee
was owed (which they denied), the amount was $290,617.64. (R. 568-612)
Pursuant to Carlson's request for injunctive relief, Carlson filed a motion for
temporary restraining order, which the district court denied on September 27, 2000
(R. 219-222), thereby rendering Carlson's claim for injunctive relief moot. Thereafter
Carlson also did not pursue its related trademark claim.
On January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into Court $12,992.74 owed to
defendants under the Distribution Agreement (R. 366, 371), the payment of which was
a condition precedent to defendants' obligation to pay Carlson the termination fee.2 On
January 25, 2001, Carlson also filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a
determination that defendants breached the Distribution Agreement, that the termination

2

On August 23, 2002, the district court entered an Order releasing these funds to
defendants, based upon the agreement of the parties (R. 1957-1961).
-5-

fee was due and payable, and dismissing the counterclaim (R. 293-363, 379-450). On
June 26, 2001, the district court denied the motion (R. 779).3
On June 25, 2001, defendants entered into a stipulation with Carlson whereby
they admitted that Carlson was entitled to a termination fee under the terms of the
Agreement, that they had breached the Agreement by prematurely terminating it, that
Carlson was entitled to recover its lost net profits based on their breach, and that they
had terminated the Agreement without cause (R. 776-777). These admissions were
directly contrary to the positions defendants had taken at the outset of the litigation
(R. 95-180, 568-612), and in opposition to Carlson's motion for partial summary
judgment (R. 632-651).
The June 25, 2001 stipulation was read into the record at the beginning of
trial (Tr. 7-8). Nevertheless, at trial, defendants argued that they were not required to
pay the termination fee, because Carlson had paid into Court the $12,992.74 it owed
defendants under the Distribution Agreement, rather than paying defendants directly
(Tr. 34-35, 37, 801, 822). Defendants asked the jury to award Carlson "zero" on its
claim for a termination fee (Tr. 801).
The jury trial on the parties' claims was held on July 30 and 31, and
August 1 and 2, 2002 (R. 1677, 1678, 1684, 1938). In connection with the trial, the
district court made a number of rulings that Carlson challenges on this appeal.
3

Most of Carlson's arguments in the motion for partial summary judgment were
obviated by defendants' admissions in the June 25, 2001 stipulation, discussed below.
-6-

First, prior to trial the court excluded evidence regarding sales of Squatters
beer by M&M Distributing Co. ("M&M"), the company defendants retained to replace
Carlson as a distributor of Squatters beer. This evidence, which Carlson intended to
use in defending against the Counterclaim, showed that Carlson's sales of Squatters
beer were much higher than those of Carlson's replacement, M&M (R. 2424).
However, the court ruled that this evidence was irrelevant.4
Second, the court granted defendants' motion for directed verdict regarding
Carlson's claim under the Distribution Act. The court held that the Distribution Act,

4

The court's ruling in this regard is missing from the record. Carlson's motion asking
the court to determine the admissibility of this evidence was heard on July 25, 2002.
The court took the motion under advisement and indicated it would issue a telephone
ruling on July 29, 2002 at 11:30 a.m., the day before the trial began (R. 1662).
Counsel for Carlson recalls that the telephone hearing was held, as scheduled, and that
the court denied Carlson's motion on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to
the best efforts issue. However, there is no minute entry reflecting the July 29
telephone hearing (Index to Record on Appeal, p. 10), and no other order reflecting the
court's ruling appears in the record. Counsel for Carlson requested counsel for
defendants to stipulate to correct the record, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h), to
reflect the court's ruling and the grounds therefor. Counsel for defendants recalls that
the court denied Carlson's motion, but indicates he does not recall the grounds for the
court's ruling. However, relevancy was the evidentiary issue the parties argued to the
court (R. 1409-1424, 1639-1652), and was also the issue on a related motion discussed
in fn.6 below. Nevertheless, because the parties cannot agree on the basis for the
court's ruling, Carlson is filing a motion asking the district court to correct the record,
pursuant to Rule 11(h). Carlson anticipates that the court will rule on this motion prior
to the time defendants' first brief is due, and Carlson will advise this Court of the
ruling in Carlson's second brief (if defendants have not already done so in their first
brief). Carlson will also include in its second brief any additional argument as may be
necessary, based upon the district court's ruling.
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which was enacted in 1998, could not be applied retroactively to defendants1
termination of the Distribution Agreement (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto).
Third, the court also granted defendants' motion for directed verdict
regarding Carlson's claim for lost net profits. The court held that Carlson, which put
on evidence of its lost gross profits, and evidence that its net profits were equivalent to
its gross profits because its costs were fixed, had failed to provide evidence necessary
to prove lost net profits with reasonable certainty (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto).
In presenting its claims to the jury, Carlson contended that it was entitled to
approximately $310,000.00 as a termination fee (Tr. 231, 789), and approximately
$9,000.00 in other damages (Ex. 52). Defendants claimed that Carlson was entitled to
no termination fee, as discussed above, and disputed Carlson's other damages.
Defendants also contended that if Carlson was entitled to a termination fee, which they
denied, the amount was $294,022.56 (Tr. 642). They also claimed $20,990.76 in
damages under their Counterclaim (Tr. 645). In its Special Verdict the jury awarded
$294,022.56 to Carlson as the termination fee and $20,990.76 to defendants on their
Counterclaim (R. 1936-1937, Add. B hereto).
Subsequently, both Carlson and defendants moved for awards of attorney fees
and costs pursuant to the Distribution Agreement. The district court denied both
motions, ruling that neither party had prevailed within the meaning of the Agreement
(R. 2362-2374, Add. D hereto). Carlson also appeals from this ruling.
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The district court granted, in part, Carlson's motion for an award of
prejudgment interest on the termination fee. However, instead of awarding interest on
the entire termination fee awarded by the jury ($294,022.56), which defendants
conceded was calculable with mathematical certainty at the time they terminated the
Distribution Agreement (10-30-02 Tr., p. 30), the court calculated interest based on the
amount defendants admitted in their Answer ($290,617.64) (R. 2350-2358, Add. E
hereto). Carlson appeals this ruling as well.
On December 5, 2002, the district court entered final Judgment in this
matter. The Judgment awarded Carlson the net amount of $324,466.32, consisting of
the termination fee, plus prejudgment interest of $51,434.52, minus the $20,990.76
awarded to defendants on their Counterclaim (R. 2359-2361, Add. A hereto).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Defendants' Wrongful Termination of the Distribution Agreement

As indicated above, Carlson and SLBC were parties to the Distribution
Agreement whereby Carlson was the exclusive distributor within the specified territory
for beer brewed by SLBC. [Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit ("Ex.") 1, Add. F hereto] Carlson
distributed both packaged beer (bottles) and draft beer (kegs) for SLBC, which sold this
micro-brew beer under the name "Squatters." The Distribution Agreement became
effective on December 15, 1994; under Section 3 it had a one year renewable term, and
it contained provisions whereby either party could terminate it with or without cause.
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In the event of a termination without cause, Section 3(b) required written
notice at least 90 days prior to the annual renewal date, December 14, so that the
Agreement would terminate on December 14. In the event that SLBC terminated the
Agreement without cause, Carlson was entitled to a "termination fee," as provided in
Section 4(d) of the Agreement.
The amount of the termination fee was .75 times Carlson's gross profit on the
sale of the beer during the 12 month period immediately preceding notice of
termination. The termination fee was due within 30 days after Carlson delivered to
SLBC certain money and property required by Section 4(c) of the Agreement. As
indicated above, on January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into Court the $12,992.74 it owed
SLBC under Section 4(c) (R. 366, 371), and the termination fee became due on
February 24, 2001.
Under Sections 10(a) of the Agreement, Carlson had the right to use the
Squatters trademarks for purposes of distributing the beer. Under Section 16(h) of the
Agreement: "If any action is brought by either party in respect to its rights under this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs as determined by the Court."
In April 2000, SLBC's micro-brewing operation merged with that of another
local brewery, Schirf Brewing Co. ("Schirf"), which sold beer under the name
"Wasatch." (Ex. 2) Defendant UBC was the merged entity, and SLBC assigned its
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rights and obligations under the Distribution Agreement to UBC (R. 447). UBC began
selling both Wasatch and Squatters beers, and Carlson continued to distribute Squatters
beer. (Tr. 52)
On July 28, 2000, SL$C notified Carlson that it was terminating the
Agreement without cause. (Ex. 3) However, SLBC's notice terminated the Agreement
effective July 31, 2000-not December 14, 2000 as per the Agreement. On August 1,
2000, UBC began using Carlson's competitor, M&M, to distribute Squatters beer.
M&M was also the distributor for Wasatch beer. (Tr. 51)
B.

Carlson's Evidence of Lost Profits from Defendants1
Wrongful Termination

Carlson's evidence of its lost profits from defendants' wrongful termination
of the Distribution Agreement is contained in Exhibit 28 (Add. G hereto, received at
Tr. 75), and the testimony of its president, Dick Carlson (Tr. 38, 70-76, 224-229).
This evidence showed lost profits of $182,444.50, calculated as follows:
1.

First, Carlson compared its sales of Squatters beer in January

through June 1999, with its sales for the same period in January through June
• 2000.5 Thus, as shown on Section I of Ex. 28, the sale of full strength cases
(i.e., beer containing an alcohol content greater than 3.2% by weight) was up

5

Carlson used January through June, rather than through the date of termination at the
end of July 2000, because July 2000 was not a representative month, due to the fact
that defendants reduced the supply of Squatters beer to Carlson in that month. (Tr. 5253, 60)
-11-

by 8%, the sale of packaged 3.2 beer (i.e., beer containing an alcohol content
of 3.2% or less, which is regulated differently in Utah than the stronger beer)
was up by 40%, and the sale of draft beer was down by 20.53%.
2.

Next, Carlson took its actual sales of Squatters beer for July

through December 1999 and applied the applicable 2000 percentage increases
or decreases. For example, in Section II.a of Ex. 28, Carlson shows July
through December 1999 sales of 1403 full strength cases, multiplied by the
8% increase in the first six months of 2000 equals projected sales of 1515
cases. With a profit margin of $3.61 per case, Carlson's projected sales
would have resulted in $5,469.15 in profits (on sales of full strength cases)
for July through December 2000. In Section II.b and c of Ex. 28, Carlson
made the same calculations for both 3.2 packaged beer (including a
calculation for both 6-pack cases and 12-pack cases), and draft beer,
respectively. Thus, Carlson's projected total profit for July through
December 2000 was $265,798.35, as shown at the end of Section II in
Ex. 28.
3.

The July through December 2000 projected profit of $265,798.35

divided by six months equals $44,299.73 per month. $44,299.73 per month
multiplied by the four and one-half months left under the Distribution
Agreement at the time of defendants' wrongful termination (i.e., July 31
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through December 15, 2000) equals $199.348.50 as shown in Section III of
Ex. 28.
4.

From the $199,348.50 in lost profits from July 31 through

December 15, 2000, Carlson subtracted the profit it made on sales of
substitute micro-brew beer (i.e., Boulder draft beer, Park City draft beer and
Moab draft beer) during the same period, as shown in Section IV of Ex. 28.
For example, in Section IV.a, Carlson sold 52 kegs of Boulder draft beer,
with a profit margin of $27.00 per keg, for a total of $1,404.00 from July 31
through December 15, 2000. Carlson made the same calculations for Park
City draft beer and Moab draft beer in Sections IV.b and c, respectively.
Thus, the total profits from the sale of these three substitute beers during
July 31 through December 15, 2000 was $16,903.10, as shown at the end of
Section IV.
5.

Accordingly, Carlson's total lost profit as shown in Section V of

Ex. 28 was $199348.50 minus $16,903.10, which equals $182,444.50.
Although this amount represented lost gross profit, Dick Carlson explained
why this amount also equalled lost net profit, because Carlson had no cost savings as
the result of the loss of the Squatters product:
Q

[By Mr. Ashton] Now, Mr. Carlson, with regard to
the $182,000 number that is a number that does not
have, other than the items you've identified,

-13-

A
Q
A

Q
A

Q

A
Q

A
Q
A
Q
A

deducted from it, any operating expenses. Why is
that?
[By Mr. Carlson] I did not eliminate or reduce any
operating expenses.
Explain that to the jury.
I did not eliminate any warehousing, any trucks,
any forklifts, any people. I did not lay anybody off.
I did not cut anyone's pay. My expenses remained
constant through the whole thing. There was no
cost savings.
When you say you didn't eliminate warehouse, what
do you mean by that?
Well, this product amounted to about four percent
of my sales. I guess, by example, if you were to
close 10 percent of this courtroom, would it cost
any less to run the building? You can't get rid of
that small part. I can't get rid of or eliminate
l/20th of one person.
Were any of the costs that you incurred prior to the
termination of the Squatter's distributorship directly
attributable to Squatter's that would have
subsequently been saved?
Will you restate that?
Well, were there any costs that were directly
attributable to Squatter's and the sale of Squatter's
prior to the termination?
Were there any costs?
Attributable to the sale of the Squatter's product?
That were eliminated?
Yes.
No.

(Tr. 74-75; See also, Tr. 224-229)
On cross examination, counsel for defendants attempted to elicit testimony
from Mr. Carlson that if the Distribution Agreement had not been terminated, Carlson
would have incurred costs in connection with the distribution of Squatters beer from
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August 1 through December 14, 2000 (Tr. 108-223). However, Mr. Carlson
consistently testified that the costs Carlson incurred during this period were not reduced
by the loss of the Squatters beer product; i.e., that his costs were the same, with or
without Squatters beer. (Id.)
Counsel for defendants also attempted to impeach Mr. Carlson with his
deposition testimony and other prior statements he had made. (Id.) However, as will
be argued below, the cross examination of Mr. Carlson, including the attempts to
impeach his testimony, raised only issues of credibility, which should have been
determined by the jury, not the judge.
During Mr. Carlson's cross examination, he also explained that any costs to
Carlson that would have been attributable to sales of Squatters beer during August 1
through December 14, 2000, had already been paid earlier in the year (Tr. 201-202).
Mr. Carlson further explained on cross examination that any cost savings for gas, oil
and drivers' time were " . . . too insignificant to calculate" (Tr. 205).
On redirect, Mr. Carlson testified that after the termination of the
Distribution Agreement, his drivers continued to service the same customers on the
same routes, delivering beer other than Squatters beer, as well as other beverages
(Tr. 224-226). He also testified on redirect that Carlson paid the same amount of
money to its employees for commission bonuses for the year 2000, as if Carlson had
continued to distribute Squatters beer after July 31 of that year (Tr. 226).
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C.

The Excluded Evidence of M&MTs Sales of Squatters Beer

Prior to trial, Carlson filed a Motion to Admit Evidence Regarding
Subsequent Sales of Squatters Beer and a supporting Memorandum (R. 1409-1424).
Carlson sought to admit two sales reports (Ex. B & C to the supporting Memorandum,
filed under seal, R. 2424), showing that after defendants wrongfully terminated the
Distribution Agreement and replaced Carlson with M&M, sales of Squatters beer by
M&M decreased dramatically, as compared with pre-termination sales by Carlson.
For example, these reports showed that Squatters beer sales dropped by 39%
from August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000 (R. 1411, 2424). From January 1 through
June 30, 2000, Carlson sold an average of 8,123 cases of Squatters beer per month.
From August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000, M&M sold an average of 5,009 cases per
month (R. 1411, 2424). Carlson argued that this evidence was relevant to the issue of
whether it used its best efforts to distribute Squatters beer, as required by Sections 8(a)
and (c) of the Distribution Agreement, and as raised by defendants' Counterclaim
(R. 1409).
Evidence establishing the relevancy of M&M's sales of Squatters beer
included the following:
1.

Defendants' own expert, Gary Fish, testified in his deposition that

M&M's sales were one factor to consider in determining whether Carlson
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used its best efforts to distribute Squatters beer (Ex. D to Carlson's
supporting Memorandum, R. 1419).
2.

Carlson also proffered testimony from its own experts, James

Merrideth and Russell Motley, that M&M's sales of Squatters beer after
Carlson's termination were relevant to the issue of whether Carlson was
using its best efforts. For example, Mr. Motley would have testified that
M&M's post-termination sales volumes showed that Carlson was using
superior efforts to sell the product, and that defendants probably did not
terminate Carlson for lack of effort. He also would have testified that in his
experience, the replacement of a distributor has never resulted in a decrease
in sales volume (R. 1412-1413).
Nevertheless, the district court refused to allow Carlson to present to the jury
evidence of M&M's decreased sales, on grounds that this evidence was irrelevant to the
issue of Carlson's best efforts.6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's Judgment should be reversed for the following reasons:
First, the court erred in granting defendants a directed verdict on the issue of
Carlson's lost profits. The court erred as a matter of law in determining that net profits

6

The trial court had previously denied Carlson's motion to compel defendants to
produce additional evidence of M&M's post-termination sales performance after
December 14, 2000, on the same grounds (R. 1255).
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could not equal gross profits, where, as here, Carlson's costs were fixed, and there
were no variable costs associated with the sale of Squatters beer, other than some costs
paid prior to defendants' wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement.
The court also erred as a matter of law in making a credibility determination
rejecting the testimony of Dick Carlson, that Carlson's costs were fixed and that there
were no cost savings as the result of the loss of the Squatters product. Thus, Carlson is
entitled to a new trial on the issue of its lost profits.
Second, the court also erred as a matter of law in granting defendants'
motion for directed verdict on Carlson's Fourth Cause of Action, alleging that
defendants' wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement also violated the
Distribution Act. The court ruled that Carlson sought to apply the Act retroactively.
However, defendants' July 31, 2000 termination occurred after the Distribution Act
went into effect on July 1, 1998.
Although the Distribution Agreement initially went into effect before the
Distribution Act did, the Distribution Agreement was really a series of one year
agreements that renewed annually, and a new agreement went into effect on
December 15 of each year. The contract that was in effect at the time of defendants'
wrongful termination was a one year contract from December 15, 1999 to
December 15, 2000, post-dating the Distribution Act.
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In addition, the impact of the Distribution Act on the parties' rights and
duties was procedural, as to which retroactive application is permitted, rather than
substantive. The same acts that Carlson claimed as a violation of the statute also
breached the contract, and the remedies Carlson sought under the statute were also
provided by the contract. Thus, Carlson's claim under the Distribution Act should be
remanded to the district court for trial or other proceedings (such as a motion for
summary judgment by Carlson).
Third, the court also committed reversible error in excluding evidence of
M&M's post-termination sales of Squatters beer, on grounds that this evidence was
irrelevant to the issue of whether Carlson used its best efforts in distributing the beer,
for purposes of defendants' Counterclaim. The issue of whether Carlson used its best
efforts cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, without comparing those efforts with the
efforts of an average, prudent, comparable brewer.
Carlson proffered evidence from both its experts and defendants' expert that
the sales by M&M were relevant to the best efforts issue. Defendants argued that
differences between M&M and Carlson, and in the economic climate and product mix
made any comparison misleading. However, defendants gave no specifics and Carlson
proffered evidence as to the similarities between M&M and Carlson. Defendants'
arguments went to the weight of the evidence, which was for the jury to determine,
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rather than to its admissibility. Moreover, in answers to interrogatories, defendants
compared Carlson's performance with that of M&M's on the best efforts issue.
Also, if the jury would have been allowed to see the relevant evidence of how
the sales of Squatters beer plummeted, after M&M replaced Carlson, it is highly likely
that the jury would have found for Carlson on the best efforts issue. Thus, Carlson is
entitled to a new trial on this issue, so that it can present the erroneously excluded
evidence to a jury.
Fourth, the district court erred as a matter of law in arbitrarily reducing the
amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury, for purposes of an award of prejudgment interest to Carlson. Defendants conceded, and the trial court ruled, that the
amount of the termination fee was calculable with mathematical certainty at the time
defendants terminated the Distribution Agreement, which is the legal standard in Utah
for award of prejudgment interest.
The district court apparently felt that Carlson overreached as to the amounts
of the termination fee it claimed at various times, and applied an arbitrary reduction as
a penalty. However, Utah law does not allow this approach. Thus, the prejudgment
interest award should be remanded to the district court with instructions to award
interest on the full amount of the $294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded
Carlson.
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Fifth, the district court abused its discretion in determining that neither
Carlson nor defendants were the prevailing party within the meaning of the attorney fee
provision of the Distribution Agreement. Because both Carlson and defendants
received a monetary award from the jury, as a matter of law both parties prevailed to
some extent.
However, and also as a matter of law, under the prevailing party language of
the Distribution Agreement there could only be one prevailing party. Thus, the district
court also erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the net judgment rule. Under that
rule, Carlson was the prevailing party, because Carlson received a net judgment, over
and above the $20,990.76 awarded defendants on their counterclaim, of $324,466.32
(including $51,434.52 in undercalculated prejudgment interest).
The district court also committed legal error in including Carlson's loss on
the statutory Distribution Act claim, in evaluating which party prevailed on the claims
under the Distribution Agreement. This matter should be remanded to the district court
with instructions to award Carlson $115,000.00 in attorney fees, as the prevailing
party, which is the amount the court has already determined to be reasonable (subject to
a possible increase, depending on the outcome of the other issues on appeal), plus
costs.
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In addition to the foregoing, Carlson should be awarded its reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the
district court on remand.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE ISSUE
OF CARLSON?S LOST PROFITS FROM THE JURY

In its Order granting defendants' motion for directed verdict on Carlson's
claim for lost profits (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto), the district court ruled that the
lost profits issue was governed by Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986). Under Sawyers only net profits are generally recoverable, which are "the
difference between gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in acquiring
such profits." (Add. C hereto, f 2). The Court further ruled that Carlson failed to
provide "proof of the costs that would necessarily be incurred, to arrive at net profits,"
so that its evidence of lost profits was "highly speculative." {Id.) The court rejected
Carlson's reliance on Distillers Distributing Corp. v. J.C. McLett Co., 310 F.2d 162
(9th Cir. 1962), a case where, on facts analogous to those here, the court found gross
profits equivalent to net profits, because there were no variable costs attributable to the
generation of the gross profits at issue there.
The district court here erred in two respects. First, it erred in ruling that, as
a matter of law, under Sawyers there can never be a situation in which there are no
costs attributable to the generation of a particular item of gross profit. Second, it erred
-22-

in making a credibility determination rejecting Dick Carlson's testimony that he had no
cost savings as the result of the loss of the Squatters product, which was for the jury to
determine.
Sawyers does not stand for the proposition that gross profits can never equal
net products. Instead, Sawyers states: "In addition to proof of gross profits, there must
generally be supporting evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of producing
income from which a net figure can be obtained." 722 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added).
Thus, Sawyers applied a general rule, not an absolute rule.
Moreover, Sawyers did not involve a situation like that here, where Carlson
presented evidence that its costs were fixed, and that it had no variable costs associated
with the sale of Squatters beer (Tr. 74-75, 205, 224-229), other than some costs paid
prior to the wrongful termination of the Distribution Agreement (Tr. 201-202). Thus,
the factual situation here is unlike Sawyers, but like Distillers Distributing, which is
persuasive authority as to the facts present here.
In Distillers Distributing, as here, plaintiff was a wholesaler of alcoholic
beverages, and, as here, defendant was the manufacturer of the beverages. Defendant
breached its contract with plaintiff by discontinuing certain promotional activities with
respect to one of the products (Calvert). The breach occurred between July 1, 1952
and December 31, 1952. The trial court calculated damages like Carlson did here, by
comparing the number of cases of Calvert sold in the last half of 1952, with the higher
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number of cases sold in the last half of 1951, and awarding plaintiff its profit on the
difference.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, affirmed the damage
calculation, holding that although only net profits are recoverable (as under Utah law),
because the evidence established that plaintiff's costs were fixed, gross profits equalled
net profits on the facts of that case:
In awarding damages for loss of profits, net profits and
not gross profits are the proper measure of recovery. . . .
But where the operating expenses are fixed, gross profits
may be awarded as representing net profits. . . . Harry
Kenney, controller for appellee from 1949 to 1958,
testified that appellee's operating expenses were fixed
and would not be substantially reduced because of the
loss of the Calvert line. This uncontradicted testimony
sustains the trial court's implicit finding that appellee's
expenses were fixed and would not have increased had
the contract not been breached. . . .
310 F.2d at 163-164 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The principle of Distillers Distributing has been followed in other
jurisdictions as well. See, P&M Vending Co., Inc. v. Half Shell of Boston, Inc., 579
P.2d 93, 95 (Colo. App. 1978) ("Where operating expenses are fixed, gross profits
may be awarded as representing net profits"); Covington Bros. v. Valley Plastering,
Inc., 566 P.2d 814, 817-819 (Nev. 1977)(same). In addition "[t]he fact that there may
have been some slight variation in the expenses is immaterial. The law does not
require that loss of profits be shown with precise accuracy. It is sufficient if the proof
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shows the basis for a reasonable estimate." McCollum v. O'Neil, 281 P.2d 493, 499
(Mont. 1955).
Here, as in Distillers Distributing, and the other cases cited for the same
principle, Dick Carlson's testimony was that Carlson's costs were fixed, and not
affected by the loss of the Squatters product. Apparently, the trial court did not believe
Mr. Carlson. However, Mr. Carlson's credibility was for the jury to determine, not
the judge. See, Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah
1982)(reversing directed verdict where one of the issues was the credibility of the
witnesses). See also, Nay, supra, requiring the district court to consider all facts and
inferences in Carlson's favor, in considering a motion for directed verdict.
Thus, the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on the issue of
Carlson's lost profits. That error should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
jury trial on the issue of Carlson's lost profits.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT CARLSON SOUGHT TO APPLY THE UTAH
BEER INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION ACT
RETROACTIVELY

The district court also granted defendants' motion for directed verdict as to
Carlson's fourth cause of action, alleging violation of the Distribution Act, on grounds
that Carlson sought to apply the Distribution Act retroactively, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 68-3-3. (R. 1952-1956, Add. C hereto) Although defendants' violation
occurred after the Distribution Act became effective, the court ruled that the relevant
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date was the date the Distribution Agreement first became effective, which was before
the Distribution Act was enacted.
Even though the Distribution Agreement contains an annual renewal
provision, the court ruled that the subject matter of this action involves contractual
terms that were agreed to before enactment of the Distribution Act. The court further
ruled that the impact of the Distribution Act was more than procedural.
In Washington National Insurance Company v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P. 2d
665, 667 (Utah App. 1990), this Court ruled that a statute could not be applied
retroactively to a contractual transaction entered into before adoption of the statute.
However, in Washington National, unlike here, the contract did not have an annual
renewal provision.
The district court erred in ignoring the impact of the annual renewal
provision of the Distribution Agreement [Ex. 1, Add. F hereto, f 3(b)] on the
retroactivity issue. The Distribution Agreement was not a contract for a term of years,
with the Distribution Act going into effect mid term. Instead, the Distribution
Agreement was a series of one year contracts, which either party could terminate by
giving notice at least 90 days before December 15 of each year.
In AMCO Insurance Co. v. Lang, 420 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1988), the court
was faced with the question whether an insured's policy incorporated a state statute
prohibiting the "stacking" of policies. The court held:
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An insurance policy, like any other contract, is
customarily governed by the law in effect at the time the
policy is issued or the contract is made. Since a statute
operates prospectively unless the legislative language
clearly indicates that it should apply retrospectively . . . .
a statute enacted during the term of an insurance policy
does not usually apply to that policy until the policy is
renewed.
Id. at 898 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).7
Here, the contract that was in effect on July 1, 1998, the effective date of the
Distribution Act (1998 Utah Laws, Ch. 328, §§ 1, 13), was a one year contract from
December 15, 1997 to December 15, 1998. At the time the Distribution Act went into
effect, the parties had no contractual rights, vested or otherwise, after December 15,
1998, only expectations. See, McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board, 88 F.3d 12,
20 (1st Cir. 1996)(no impairment of contractual rights where rights had not yet vested).
Similarly, the contract that was in effect at the time of defendants' wrongful termination
of the Distribution Agreement on July 31, 2000, was a one year contract from
December 15, 1999 (after the Distribution Act went into effect) to December 15, 2000.
The fact that the terms of the Distribution Agreement did not change from
year to year is of no moment. The fact is that a new one year contract was made each

7

In AMCO, the legislature had directed that the amended statute at issue would apply to
all policies 'that are executed, issued, issued for delivery, delivered, continued, or
renewed' after the amendment's effective date. Id. However, this legislative directive
merely reflected the fact that a renewed contract is, for all intents and purposes, a new
contract, as the court held.
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year, when the parties did not exercise their right of termination. Thus, Carlson was
not applying the Distribution Act retroactively. See, AMCO, supra.
The district court also erred in ruling that the impact of the Distribution Act
on the parties was more than procedural. As discussed in Washington National, a
statute may be applied retroactively if its only impact is procedural, as opposed to
impacting substantive rights. Washington National explained this distinction as follows:
If a statutory amendment changes the contractual
rights and obligations of the parties, it is substantive. ...
However, if the amendment merely affects the legal
machinery by which parties enforce their rights under the
contract, ... it is procedural.
795 P.2d at 665 (citations and footnote omitted).
Here, Carlson's fourth cause of action (R. 461) invoked only two sections of
the Distribution Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-lla-103(l) and 32A-lla-109 (Add. H
hereto). Section 32A-1 la-103(1) merely protected Carlson from wrongful termination
of the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the same acts that violated the contract also
violated the statute.
Section 32A-1 la-109 made the Distribution Agreement binding upon UBC,
as SLBC's successor in interest. However, UBC was contractually bound anyway,
because SLBC assigned its right and its obligations under the Distribution Agreement to
UBC (R. 447). Moreover, in its June 25, 2001 Stipulation (R. 776-777), UBC
admitted it was bound by the Distribution Agreement.
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In addition, the remedies Carlson sought under the Distribution Act, damages
and attorney fees, were the same remedies to which it was entitled for breach of the
Distribution Agreement. Thus, the provisions of the Distribution Act Carlson sought to
apply gave Carlson no greater rights, and defendants no greater obligations or
liabilities, than did the Distribution Agreement, and were purely procedural changes to
the legal machinery for enforcement of Carlson's contractual rights.
Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Carlson's fourth cause of
action, and this Court should remand with directions to reinstate this cause of action.8
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN RULING THAT EVIDENCE OF M&M'S POSTTERMINATION SALES OF SQUATTERS BEER WAS
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CARLSON
USED ITS BEST EFFORTS IN DISTRIBUTING THAT BEER

Prior to trial, the district court denied Carlson's Motion to Admit Evidence
Regarding Subsequent Sales of Squatters Beer. The court ruled that the evidence
Carlson sought to introduce, showing that after defendants terminated Carlson and
replaced it with M&M, sales of Squatters beer decreased dramatically, was irrelevant to
the issue of whether Carlson used its best efforts in marketing the beer. Presumably,
8

On remand, defendants' liability under the fourth cause of action can likely be
determined by summary judgment. It is undisputed that UBC was bound by the
Distribution Agreement, and that defendants wrongfully terminated that Agreement, in
violation of both the Agreement and the Act. Damages may be the only issue to be
determined by the jury on remand. Also, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 32A-lla110(2)(a)(ii), the district court should be instructed that if Carlson prevails on the
Distribution Act claim, it should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred on that claim, including fees and costs incurred on this appeal.
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the court relied on the arguments defendants made in opposing Carlson's Motion (R.
1639-1652).
Defendants primarily relied on Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F.
Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1979). In Bloor the Court
adopted, in part, a subjective interpretation of a "best efforts" contractual provision,
rather than an objective standard of the 'average, prudent and comparable brewer.'
454 F. Supp. at 266-267. Thus, the court ruled that best efforts were measured by the
defendant's capabilities, not by the capabilities of others in the market. From this
ruling, defendants argued that sales by M&M were irrelevant to the issue of whether
Carlson used best efforts to market the beer.
However, Bloor noted that there was authority for applying the objective
standard. 454 F. Supp. at 266, citing Arnold Productions, Inc. v. Favorite Films
Corp., 176 F. Supp. 862, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962).
Arnold held:
In ascertaining best efforts we would have to compare
defendant's performance with the average, prudent
comparable distributor in the T.V. market.
176 F. Supp. at 866 (emphasis added).
Moreover, in evaluating whether the defendant in Bloor utilized its best
efforts, the court used the objective, 'average, prudent and comparable' standard in at
least three instances:
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I find that Guinness-Harp presented Falstaff with an
opportunity to promote Ballantine products that an
"average, prudent, comparable brewer" situated as was
Falstaff reasonably would and should have explored and
sought to exploit.
454 F. Supp. at 269 (emphasis added).
These actions and failure to act were not consistent with
those of the average, prudent, comparable brewer in the
same circumstances seeking to promote a beer to the
extent of his best efforts. . . .
454 F. Supp. at 271 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, I find that from September 1975 until
the present, Falstaff has breached the covenant in its
agreement with plaintiff's predecessor, in that it failed
without justification to use its best efforts to promote the
sale of Ballantine products and has neglected to act in the
manner required of the average, prudent, comparable
brewer in marketing his product.
454 F. Supp. at 272 (emphasis added). Thus, even under Bloor, the issue of whether
Carlson used its best efforts cannot be evaluated in a vacuum, without comparing those
efforts with the efforts of "the average, prudent, comparable brewer."
Also, in Bloor, the court considered evidence of monthly sales by defendant's
predecessor. 454 F. Supp. at 263. The Second Circuit also considered this evidence in
affirming the district court in Bloor. 601 F.2d at 611.
One reason the defendants here terminated Carlson is because they wanted
M&M as their distributor instead (Tr. 340-341). M&M was already distributing
Wasatch beer for Schirf, the other principal (along with SLBC) in UBC. (Tr. 51)
-31-

Thus, defendants can hardly dispute that M&M was anything less than "the average,
prudent, comparable brewer."
Yet, after M&M replaced Carlson, sales of Squatters beer dropped by 39%
from August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000 (R. 1411-1424). From January 1 through
June 30, 2000, Carlson sold an average of 8,123 cases of Squatters beer per month.
From August 1, 2000 to December 14, 2000, M&M sold an average of 5,009 cases per
month (R. 1411-1424).
Carlson proffered testimony from its own experts that M&M's posttermination sales were relevant to whether Carlson used its best efforts, that this
evidence showed Carlson was using superior efforts, and that, in the experience of one
of the experts, Mr. Motley, the replacement of a distributor has never resulted in a
decrease in sales (R. 1412-1413).
Even defendants' expert, Mr. Fish testified in his deposition that M&M's
sales were one factor to consider in determining whether Carlson used its best efforts
(R. 1419-1422):
Q.
A.

[by Mr. Ashton] It's one factor that you ought to
consider is it not?
[by Mr. Fish] It is one factor that you ought to
consider.

(R. 1422) Also, in answers to interrogatories, defendants compared Carlson's
performance with M&M's performance on the issue of best efforts (R. 1412-1413,
1644).
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Nevertheless, defendants conclusorily argued that differences between
Carlson and M&M, and differences in the economic climate and product mix made any
comparison misleading. However, defendants gave no specifics, and any such
distinctions go to the weight of the evidence, which is for the jury to decide, not to
admissibility. See, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29,
347 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959)(issue of whether evidence was too remote to be
relevant went to weight of evidence, not admissibility). In addition, Carlson proffered
evidence as to the similarities between it and M&M, as compared with General
Distributing, the largest distributor in the area. (R. 1222)
Defendants also implied, without proffering any evidentiary support, that
sales data later than that upon which Carlson relied showed that M&M's sales had
increased. However, as indicated above, it was Mr. Motley's experience that sales
never decrease after a change in distributors. Again, however, all of these matters go
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
If the district court had not erroneously excluded relevant evidence of
M&M's post-termination sales of Squatters beer, there is more than a reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have found for Carlson on defendants' counterclaim.
See, Ortiz, supra (erroneous evidentiary ruling will be reversed if reasonable likelihood
that, absent the error, there would have been a more favorable outcome for the
appellant). The other evidence with respect to best efforts is summarized below.
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Defendants offered anecdotal evidence from customers who expressed
dissatisfaction with the level of service they received from Carlson. (Tr. 425-428, 436437, 444) However, Carlson offered evidence that other customers were totally
satisfied and pleased with Carlson's performance (Tr. 665, 672-673).
Defendants also cited to declining sales of draft beer by Carlson (Tr. 465,
Def. Ex. 30). However, Carlson's sales of packaged beer (cans and bottles) was
increasing (Tr. 271, Ex. 12, 28). Also, Carlson offered evidence that the declining
sales of Squatters draft beer were due to SLBC's failure to provide Carlson with five
gallon kegs, which were offered by SLBC's competitors (Tr. 584-586, 696-741,
Ex. 12, 33b, 33c), and that sales of beer by one of SLBC's primary competitors,
including draft beer, were also down (Tr. 371, Ex. 12, 33a).
In addition, while one of defendants' experts, Gary Fish, opined that Carlson
was not using best efforts (Tr. 615), two of Carlson's experts, James Merrideth, and
Russell Motley, opined to the contrary (Tr. 704, 763).
Thus, the evidence regarding Carlson's best efforts was conflicting, and it
would have likely taken very little additional evidence to sway the jury in Carlson's
favor. Moreover, the most important evidence by which to measure Carlson's
performance was sales (Tr. 694-695, 727-728). Thus, if the jury would have been
allowed to see the relevant evidence of how the sales of Squatters beer plummeted,
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after M&M replaced Carlson, it is highly likely that the jury would have found for
Carlson on defendants1 counterclaim.
In sum, the district court erred in excluding relevant evidence of M&M's
post-termination sales of Squatters beer. If the jury had considered this evidence, it is
very likely that it would have returned a verdict for Carlson on the best efforts issue.
Thus, the Judgment in favor of defendants on their counterclaim must be reversed, and
the case remanded for a new trial on the counterclaim, with instructions to admit
evidence on M&M's post-termination sales volumes for Squatters beer.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
ARBITRARILY AWARDING CARLSON
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON AN AMOUNT
LESS THAN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE
TERMINATION FEE THE JURY AWARDED
CARLSON

Under Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement, in the event SLBC
terminated the Agreement without cause, SLBC owed Carlson a termination fee equal
to .75 times Carlson's gross profit on the sale of Squatters beer during the 12-month
period immediately preceding notice of termination. The fee was due 30 days after
Carlson delivered to SLBC certain money and property required by Section 4(c) of the
Agreement (Ex. 1, Add. F hereto).
The jury awarded Carlson a termination fee of $294,022.56 (R. 1936-1937).
On January 25, 2001, Carlson paid into court the $12,992.74 it owed SLBC under
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Section 4(c) of the Distribution Agreement (R. 366, 371), and the termination fee
became due on February 25, 2001.
In their Answer (R. 568-612), while defendants denied owing a termination
fee, they contended that if the fee was owed, the amount was $290,617.64. At trial,
while defendants again argued that no fee was owed (Tr. 34-35, 37, 801, 822),
contrary to their prior Stipulation (R. 776-777; Tr. 7-8), they contended that if the fee
was owed the amount was $294,022.56, the same amount the jury awarded.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest (R. 2350-2358, Add. E hereto), the district court entered findings
and conclusions as to the above and related matters. In addition, the district court
ruled: "The amount of the termination fee was sufficiently subject to calculation and
measurement with reference to facts and figures" (Add. E, Conclusion of Law No. 5).
This is the standard in Utah for award of pre-judgment interest. See, Bjork v. April
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, den., 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
Defendants conceded that the amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury was
calculable with mathematical certainty at the time they terminated the Distribution
Agreement (10-30-02 Tr., p. 30).
Despite the foregoing, the district court erroneously awarded prejudgment
interest only on the $290,617.64 defendants alleged in their Answer, rather than the
$294,022.56 the jury awarded, as calculated by defendants for purposes of trial. The
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court ruled: "However, as a result of Carlson's own excessive miscalculations, it is
only entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of $290,617.64, which is the
amount admitted to by Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim" (Add. E,
Conclusion of Law No. 7).
The district court cited no authority for this puzzling ruling, and there is none
under Utah law. Even defendants never argued that prejudgment interest should be
awarded on anything less than the full amount of the termination fee awarded by the
jury (R. 2284-2292).
Apparently, the district court felt that Carlson overreached as to the amounts
of the termination fee it claimed at various times (Add. E, Finding No. 14), and applied
an arbitrary reduction as a penalty. Again, however, Utah law does not permit such an
approach, which overlooks two facts. First, defendants had the benefit of the use of the
full amount of the termination fee awarded by the jury, from the time this fee was due
on February 25, 2001. Second, defendants conceded after trial that this amount was
calculable at the time they terminated the Distribution Agreement (yet alleged a lower
amount in their Answer). See, Lefavi v. Bertoch, supra, 2000 Utah App. 5, | 24, 994
P.2d 817, 822 (prejudgment interest is designed to compensate a party for the loss of
the use of money over time, and to deter parties from intentionally withholding an
amount that is liquidated and owing).
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As discussed above, the district court's prejudgment interest decision presents
a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. Id. at \ 23. This decision is
contrary to Utah law, arbitrary and capricious, and must be reversed and remanded as a
matter of law, with instructions to the district court to award prejudgment interest on
the full amount of the $294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded Carlson.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
ARBITRARILY DETERMINING THAT CARLSON
WAS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY FOR
PURPOSES OF AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS UNDER THE DISTRIBUTION
AGREEMENT, WHERE CARLSON RECEIVED A
NET JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF $324,000.00

At the beginning of this case (R. 568-612), and at trial (Tr. 34-35, 37, 801,
822), defendants claimed they owed Carlson nothing, and instead that Carlson owed
them. However, the Judgment Carlson received was for $324,466.32, consisting of the
$294,022.56 termination fee the jury awarded, plus pre-judgment interest (under
calculated by the Court as $51,434.52), minus the $20,990.76 awarded to defendants
on their Counterclaim (R. 2359-2361).
Nevertheless, despite Carlson's overwhelming victory in this case, the district
court ruled that neither party prevailed, for purposes of awarding attorney fees and
costs. That decision was just as arbitrary and capricious as the court's pre-judgment
interest decision, and must be reversed, even under the abuse of discretion standard of
review.
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The district court purported to apply factors set forth in R. T. Nielson Co. v.
Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119, for determining who the prevailing party is, and
entered findings and conclusions with respect to the factors (R. 2362-2374, Add. D
hereto). However, the court misapplied those factors.9
In R.T. Nielson, plaintiff Nielson sued defendant Cook for breach of
contract, and defendant Cook counterclaimed for breach of the same contract. The jury
awarded Nielson $182,483.00 on one item of damage and $11,509.00 for other items.
The jury also awarded Cook $19,521.00 on his counterclaim. This verdict resulted in a
net judgment in favor of Cook for $162,962.00 plus $11,509.00, and pre-judgment
interest on both amounts.
The contract had a "prevailing party" attorney fee provision similar to the
one here in Section 16(h) of the Distribution Agreement, which states: "If any action is
brought by either party in respect to its rights under the Agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined by the
Court." (Add. F hereto) The district court determined that Nielson was the prevailing
9

Ordinarily, one would have to marshal the evidence in support of the district court's
findings of fact in order to mount an attack on those findings. See, Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). However, Carlson does not dispute the
court's subsidiary findings, including the findings that all of the claims in this case were
important ones (Add. D hereto). The only findings that Carlson disputes are that
neither party prevailed (Finding Nos. 25 and 26). As to those findings, Carlson
contends that the court erred as a matter of law, where there was a monetary award to
both parties. Carlson also contends that in this circumstance, the district court also
erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the net judgment rule. These points are
argued further below.
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party and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Thus, on facts virtually identical to those
here, the party who received the net judgment was determined to be the prevailing
party. See also, Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-557
(Utah App. 1989) (which the district court here also purported to follow, but actually
did not).
The starting point in the R.T. Nielson analysis is that, in most cases,
determining the prevailing party is simple (as it should have been here):
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, "determining the 'prevailing
party1 for purposes of awarding fees [can oftentimes be]
quite simple." 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Where a plaintiff sues for money damages, and plaintiff
wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant
successfully defends and avoids adverse judgments,
defendant has prevailed. Id. . . .
2000 UT 111 at 1 23, 40 P.3d at 1126. Here, as in R.T. Nielson, plaintiff sued for
damages and won, with the only slightly complicating factor being the small verdict for
the defendants on the counterclaims in both cases.
The most fundamental abuse of discretion by the district court here was in
determining that neither party was the prevailing party. The reality is that both Carlson
and defendants prevailed to some extent, but under the contract language here, and in
R.T. Nielson, there can be only one prevailing party, and here that party is Carlson.
R. T Nielson did note that there can be situations in which neither party
prevails, in which case neither party is awarded fees. 2000 UT 111 at ^ 25, 40 P.3d at
-40-

1127. That situation would have occurred here if the jury had awarded Carlson nothing
on its claims and defendants nothing on their counterclaim.
However, that is not what happened. Here, as in R.T. Nielson, and
Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, both parties prevailed monetarily to some extent,
and the district court had to choose which party prevailed to the greatest extent, because
under the contractual language in all three cases there could be only one prevailing
party.
R.T. Nielson held that both parties prevailed there:
At trial RTNC [i.e. Nielson] prevailed on its claim
for breach of contract and was awarded $182,483 by the
jury. RTNC also prevailed on its unjust enrichment
claim ... and was awarded $11,509 by the jury. RTNC
further prevailed in the sense that the jury found that
RTNC and Ronald Nielsen did not have a fiduciary
relationship with Cook. Cook, on the other hand,
prevailed in the sense that the jury found that RTNC
breached the Services Agreement as alleged by Cook and
awarded Cook damages of $19,521.
2000 UT 111 at if 26, 40 P.3d at 1127 (emphasis added); See also, Mountain States
Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 556 (where both plaintiff and defendant were
awarded monetary amounts, both were considered as prevailing to some extent). While
the district court has discretion, that discretion is not unfettered. The district court here
did not have discretion to call both parties losers, when in fact both parties were
winners to some extent, so that the court had to decide which party prevailed to the
greater extent.
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R.T. Nielsen also held that under the contractual language there, which is
almost identical to that here, there could be but one prevailing party:
In most cases involving language similar to the
contractual language before us here, there can generally
be only one prevailing party.
2000 UT 111 at 1 25, 40 P.3d at 1127, citing Mountain States Broadcasting, supra,
(emphasis added).
Moreover, the contract between the parties
indicated that attorney fees were to be awarded to the
'prevailing party.' Prevailing party is singular in form,
not plural, suggesting that only one prevailing party was
contemplated.
R.T. Nielsen at 1 26. Carlson submits that in most cases, including this one, where
both plaintiff and defendant are awarded monetary relief, and there can be only one
prevailing party under the language of the contract (or statute), the prevailing party is
the one that receives the net judgment, here Carlson. The district court here erred as a
matter of law in failing to apply this analysis.
Mountain States Broadcasting is not to the contrary. There, this Court held
that the net judgment rule should not be "mechanically applied in all cases, although it
will usually be at least a good starting point." 783 P.2d at 557 Nevertheless, the net
judgment rule there was the determinative point, as a matter of law:
We hold that in the present circumstances the party
in whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered must be
considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an
award of its fees.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that NBA, in
view of its net recovery of approximately $85,000, is the
sole 'prevailing party' as a matter of law.
Id. at 556 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
R.T. Nielson is also not to the contrary. Although it cited to a non-exclusive
list of factors that may or may not be relevant in determining the prevailing party,
depending on the circumstances, in the end it too applied the net judgment rule. The
specific factors cited were:
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties,
(3) the importance of the claims relative to each other
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit
considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts
attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims.
40P.3dat 1127.
However, R.T. Nielson did not apply those factors "mechanically," as the
district court did here, to a situation where not all of them apply. Of these factors, the
most important one, and, as discussed above, the one R. T. Nielson focused on the
most, was the first one, the language of the contract.
With regard to the second factor, R.T. Nielson did discuss the various claims
by both parties. As discussed above, the court held that both parties prevailed to some
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extent, and determined that because only one party could be the prevailing party under
the contract, that party was the one that received the net judgment.
As to the third factor, and unlike the district court here, R.T. Nielson did not
address the "importance of the claims," because it had no bearing in a relatively noncomplex case, like that case, and this case. Regarding the fourth factor, R.T. Nielson
considered the amounts awarded to both parties (i.e., the net judgment), but unlike the
district court here, made no attempt to compare the amount of the claim with the
amount of the recovery.
The present case is not a complex case. Carlson asserted three claims pled as
four: (1) breach of various provisions of the Distribution Agreement, including the
obligation to pay the termination fee, (2) breach of Section 10(a) of the Agreement
granting Carlson the right to use the Squatters Trademark, and (3) breach of the
Distribution Act. Carlson's fourth claim, for injunctive relief, was really not a claim at
all, but one of the remedies it sought for breach of the contract, primarily the Section
10(a) trademark provisions (R. 451). Defendants asserted a counterclaim seeking
money damages for breach of the best efforts provision of the contract (R. 568).
The fact that Carlson did not prevail on all of its claims, or did not recover
the full amount it sought on the termination fee, does not mean it is not the prevailing
party. Where a party prevails on some, but not all of its claims, and does not recover
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the full amount of the claims upon which it does prevail, that party is still the prevailing
party. See, Highland Const. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981).
A partially prevailing party is still entitled to its attorney fees, which are
simply reduced to the extent appropriate to reflect degree of success. See, Mountain
States Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 556, n.10 (prevailing party not entitled to fees
on claims as to which it did not prevail); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
989 (Utah 1988) (degree of success is one factor in determining reasonableness of
fees). Thus, in focusing on Carlson's degree of success on the prevailing party issue,
the district court confused the standards applicable to the amount of the fee, with the
standards applicable to entitlement to fees, as the prevailing party.
If there had been no counterclaim, and the only claim Carlson prevailed on
was the termination fee, Carlson indisputably would have been the prevailing party.
Because defendants did have a counterclaim, upon which they prevailed, the only
additional prevailing party analysis required was application of the net judgment rule,
as in R.T. Nielson and Mountain States Broadcasting.
The district court here also erred in attempting to analyze the importance of
the claims in this non-complex case, and in particular the alleged importance of the
denial of Carlson's motion for temporary restraining order. (Add. D hereto, Findings
Nos. 7, 8, 24, Conclusion No. 6) That loss became irrelevant, for purposes of a
prevailing party analysis, when Carlson prevailed on the termination fee issue and
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received a substantial monetary award, far in excess of the amount awarded defendants
on their counterclaim.
The "importance" of a claim for monetary relief is measured by the amount
of money awarded on that claim. It would have been a different story if one of the
parties was awarded injunctive or other non-monetary relief that cannot be objectively
measured. If that had occurred the district court would then have been required to
assess the "importance" of that non-monetary relief. See, Mountain States
Broadcasting Co., supra, 783 P.2d at 556, n. 7 [determination of prevailing party may
be complicated in cases involving "the granting of non-monetary relief to one or more
parties" (emphasis added)].
Again, the fact that Carlson prevailed only on the portion of its breach of
contract claim seeking the termination fee, is reflected in the amount of the attorney fee
award, under the degree of success component of the analysis of the reasonableness of
the attorney fees sought and awarded. Here, Carlson reduced the amount of its
attorney fee claim substantially based on a degree of success analysis (R. 1973-2132,
2316-2324).
Also, although the district court erroneously determined that neither party
prevailed, it went on to rule on the reasonableness of the amount of attorney fees
claimed by both parties. The court further reduced the fees Carlson sought, based on
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degree of success, ruling that a reasonable fee for Carlson (and defendants)

was

$115,000.00 each. (Add. D hereto, Findings Nos. 27-34.) While Carlson does not
agree with the district court's reduction, Carlson does not contend that the reduction
was an abuse of discretion. Thus, on remand, Carlson should receive a $115,000.00
fee award as the prevailing party,11 plus costs (including deposition costs) in an amount
to be determined by the district court.
Another fundamental legal error the district court made in its analysis of the
prevailing party on the claims and counterclaim brought under the Distribution
Agreement, was including Carlson's claim for breach of the Distribution Act in that
analysis (Add. D hereto, Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 12, 13, 24). Carlson's claim under
the Distribution Act was a statutory claim, not a claim for breach of contract, and
should not have been considered in determining the prevailing party on the claims
brought under the contract. Section 16(h) of the contract, quoted in full above,
provides for attorney fees on a claim by a party "in respect to its rights under this
Agreement" (emphasis added). Even under the district court's erroneous analysis that
the parties' respective wins and losses equalled each other, once Carlson's loss on the

The district court's determination of the amount of a reasonable fee award to
defendants is irrelevant, since, as discussed above, there cannot be two prevailing
parties.
n

Of course, if, as a result of this appeal, Carlson prevails on additional claims, this will
further solidify its prevailing party status, and will require the district court to increase
the amount of a fee award that would be reasonable.
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Distribution Act claim is removed from the equation, that makes Carlson the overall
winner, i.e., the prevailing party.12
In sum, the district court abused its discretion, as a matter of law, in finding
that neither party prevailed, where both parties received a monetary award from the
jury. In this situation, the court also erred as a matter of law, in failing to apply the net
judgment rule, under which Carlson is the prevailing party. The court also committed
legal error in including Carlson's loss on the statutory Distribution Act claim, in
evaluating who was the prevailing party as to the claims under the Distribution
Agreement. This matter should be remanded to the district court with instructions to
award Carlson $115,000 in attorney fees, the amount the court has already found to be
reasonable (or a greater amount, depending on the outcome of the other issues on
appeal), plus costs in an amount to be determined by the district court.
In addition, under Section 16(h) of the Distribution Agreement, Carlson
should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal.

Also, in Finding No. 19 (Add. D hereto), the district court found that defendants
presented evidence at trial that the amount of the termination fee was $294,022.56, the
amount awarded by the jury. While that finding is technically accurate, it is incomplete
and misleading. At trial defendants' primary position was that, contrary to its prior
Stipulation, "zero" termination fee was owed (Tr. 801), because Carlson paid the
money it owed defendants into court, rather than paying defendants directly (Tr.34-35,
37, 801, 822). Moreover, even if defendants had conceded that the $294,022.56 was
owed, or even paid that amount during the litigation, this would not affect the
prevailing party analysis. See, Mountain States Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d at 551
("for purposes of an award of fees to the 'prevailing party,' sums voluntarily paid
during the course of the action are treated as if paid by judgment").
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Carlson requests the following relief on this
appeal:
(1) Reversal of the district court's directed verdict against Carlson on the
lost profit issue, and remand for a new trial on this issue.
(2) Reversal of the court's directed verdict against Carlson on its Fourth
Cause of Action under the Distribution Act, and remand for a new trial or other
proceedings (such as Carlson's motion for summary judgment) on this claim, with
instructions that, if Carlson prevails on this claim, it is to be awarded reasonable
attorney fees and costs, including fees and costs incurred on this appeal as to this claim.
(3) Reversal of the court's decision to exclude evidence of M&M's posttermination sales of Squatters beer, and remand for a new trial on defendants'
counterclaim, with instructions to allow the jury to hear this evidence.
(4) Reversal of the court's decision to allow pre-judgment interest only on
$290,617.64 of the $294,022.56 termination fee, with instructions to award prejudgment interest on the entire amount of this fee, on remand.
(5) Reversal of the court's decision that neither party prevailed in this
action, for purposes of an award of attorney fees and costs, with instructions to award
Carlson $115,000 in attorney fees for the period prior to Carlson's appeal (or
depending on the outcome of the other issues on appeal, a greater amount to be
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determined by the district court), plus costs to be determined by the district court, on
remand.
(6) Award of Carlson's reasonable attorney fees and costs on this appeal, in
an amount to be determined by the district court on remand.
DATED this JV

day of June, 2003.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

/Idim P. Ashton
/^James A. Boevers
Thomas R. Barton
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the d*Q

day of June, 2003, I caused two copies

of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage
prepaid thereon, to the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Scott A. Call, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
and Cross-Appellants
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John P. Ashton(0314)
Thomas R. Barton (6827)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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OF JUDGMENTS
UDGMENTS/
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DATE.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

CARLSON DISTRIBUTING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

JUDGMENT

vs.
Case No. 000906096
SALT LAKE BREWING, CO., L . C , a
Utah limited liability company, and
UTAH BREWERS COOPERATIVE,
L . C , a Utah limited liability company

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in this matter as follows:
1.

In an amount of $294,022.56 in favor of Plaintiff Carlson Distributing

Company ("Carlson") and against Defendants Salt Lake Brewing, Co., L.C. ("SLBC") and
Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. ("UBC");

YEATES
ZAHLER
I, Suite 900
100 South
ke City
34111
J4-1000
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2.

Carlson is also awarded prejudgment interest against SLBC and UBC in an

amount of $49,842.12 through November 15, 2002, and $79.62 per day thereafter through
the date of this Judgment.
3.

In an amount of $20,990.76 in favor of SLBC and against Carlson;

4.

This judgment is a final judgment pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(a).

DATED this

day of November, 2002.
COURT:

Medley
ourt Judge
Approved as to form

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 2002,1 caused to be mailed,

first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the proposed JUDGMENT to the
following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Scott A. Call, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Third Jutici* ~
Q
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
' " ' !'
STATE OF UTAH
••'••^•••w

CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

^PwyBwiT
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
Case No. 000906096
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; UTAH
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L.C., a Utah
limited liability company,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

We, the Jury in the above-entitled action, find as follows:
As to the claim of Carlson Distributing Company for a termination fee, what is the
amount of the termination fee?

A. Did Defendants breach the distribution agreement by raising the price of
Squatters' beer effective May 15, 2000?
[_] Yes

£0 No

B.
If your answer to the prior question is "yes," what is the amount that
Carlson was damaged thereby?
$

3.

O

A.
As to the claim of Salt Lake Brewing Co., did Carlson Distributing
Company breach the distribution agreement by failing to use its best efforts in the sale,
marketing, and distribution of Squatters beer?

00 Yes

[_] No

B.
If your answer to question 3 A is "no", please do not answer any more
questions. If your answer to question 3A is "yes," please answer the following
question:

Do you find that Defendants waived their right to sue Carlson for this breach?
[_] Yes

[X ] No

C.
If your answer to question 3B is "yes," please do not answer any more
questions. If your answer to question 3B is "no," please answer the following
question:
What is the amount that Salt Lake Brewing Co. was damaged as a result of
Carlson's breach?
$
DATED:

X P , 1 ftp, 7 ^

August J > _ , 2002.

FOREPERSON:

^.k).

Add "P."

FJU0 DISTRICT COURT
T

^d

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg, #3726
Scott A. Call, #0544
Jennifer R. Eshelman, #9155
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697

judicfe, District

W

1 9 2002

V LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk"

Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs
Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers
Cooperative, L.C.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L . C , a
Utah limited liability company; UTAH
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L . C , a Utah
limited liability company,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS7COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON
(1) PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION ACT and
(1) PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR LOST NET
PROFITS

Case No. 000906096
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

The trial of the above-captioned matter commenced on July 30, 2002, at 9:00 a.m.,
before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. Plaintiff/counterdefendant was represented by John
P. Ashton and Thomas R. Barton of Prince Yeates & Geldzahler. Defendants/counterclaimants
were represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg and Scott A. Call of Anderson & Karrenberg. At
the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case in chief, defendants moved for a directed verdict on (1)

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the Utah Beer Industry Beer Distribution Act
("Distribution Act") and (2) Plaintiffs claims for lost net profits for breach of the distribution
agreement.

The court, having considered defendants' motions, having heard argument of

counsel and having reviewed all pertinent papers on file, hereby makes and enters the following
rulings:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendants' motion for directed verdict on Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action for

Violation of the Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act (the "Act") is granted. Even though there
is an annual renewal provision in the contract, the subject matter of the action involves terms
that were agreed upon before the Act was passed. The Act would have more than a mere
procedural impact upon the rights of the parties and its application would be retroactive in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3, and there is no express provision in the Act providing
that it should be applied retroactively.
2.

Defendants' motion for directed verdict on Plaintiffs claims for lost net profits

for breach of the distribution agreement is granted. Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d
773 (Utah 1986), is controlling. Sawyers expressly provides that only lost net profits are
recoverable. It defines lost net profits as the difference between gross profits and the expenses
that would be incurred in acquiring such profits. The Plaintiff was required to prove its lost net
profits with reasonable certainty.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the showing of lost profits here is highly speculative because the amount of Plaintiff's
lost net profits is not determinable from the evidence. The case of Distillers Distributing Corp.
v. J.C. McLettCo.. 310 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1962) relied upon by the Plaintiff is not the law in
080602 Order on Directed Verdict Re Distribution Act
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the state of Utah. Even in the appellate court's analysis of the Distillers case it is made clear
that the trial judge did an expense/cost analysis to justify an award of the net amount due.
Proof of lost gross profits is not a proper basis for a damage amount without proof of the costs
that would necessarily be incurred to arrive at net profits. Reasonable certainty requires more
than a mere estimate. Moreover, under the present state of the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, reasonable minds cannot differ that the Plaintiff has failed to
prove lost net profits.

Plaintiff has shown gross income and that costs were incurred in

producing gross income up to the date of termination, but not any specifics from which lost net
profits can be determined. Therefore, the court finds there is no basis for extension of Sawyers
in this matter.
DATED:

August ' f , 2002.
BY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER

John P. Ashton
Thomas R. Barton
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COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that on August

5

•L., 2002, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERCLAIMANTS'

MOTIONS

FOR

DDRECTED

VERDICT

ON

PLAINTDJF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER INDUSTRY
DISTRIBUTION ACT and PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR LOST NET PROFITS to be served, via
hand delivery, upon:

John P. Ashton
Thomas R. Barton
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

day of August, 2002, and following entry thereof, I

caused to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy

of

the

within

and

foregoing

ORDER

GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON (1)
PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE BEER INDUSTRY
DISTRIBUTION ACT and PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR LOST NET PROFITS, to:
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Scott A. Call, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Ste 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Attorneys for Defendants
John P. Ashton
Thomas R. Barton
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Clerk
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg, #3726
Scott A. Call, #0544
Jennifer R. Eshelman, #9155
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs
Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers
Cooperative, L.C.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CARLSON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, ]
a Utah corporation,
])
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
])
)
v.

t

SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; UTAH
BREWERS COOPERATIVE, L.C, a Utah
limited liability company,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

)
;
;)
;
]
;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE CROSSMOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS
Case No. 000906096
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

After the conclusion of the trial of this matter, both the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson"), and Defendants/Counterclaimants Salt Lake
Brewing Co., L.C., ("Salt Lake Brewing") and Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. ("Utah
Brewers") filed motions for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The parties extensively
briefed the issues and the cross-motions for attorneys' fees came on for hearing before this
Court on Wednesday, October 30, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Carlson was represented
by John P. Ashton and Thomas R. Barton of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler;
Defendants/Counterclaimants Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers were represented by
Thomas R. Karrenberg and Scott A. Call of Anderson & Karrenberg.
The Court, having carefully reviewed the parties' respective cross-motions for
attorneys' fees and costs and related papers, having heard oral argument thereon, and being
familiar with the course of the litigation took the matter under advisement.

On Monday,

November 4, 2002, the Court announced its decision in open court, finding that neither party is
the prevailing party and that neither party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
The Court hereby makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
further support of its ruling.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, dated February 15, 2001, asserts four causes of

action. They are denominated: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Violation of Trademark Rights; (3)
Injunctive Relief; and (4) Violation of Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act.
2.

The First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract asserts four distinct claimed

breaches of the Distribution Agreement ("Agreement") between Plaintiff and Defendants: (1)
premature termination of the Agreement (Amended Complaint, f 41); (2) improper price
increase (Amended Complaint, f 42); (3) failing to supply product (Amended Complaint, f
42); and (4) a termination fee under Section 4(d) of the Agreement (Amended Complaint, f
46).
3.

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of Trademark asserted that

Defendants breached § 10 of the Agreement. (See Amended Complaint, ^ 50, 52.)
4.

In the Third Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief, the Plaintiff sought an order

requiring Defendants to abide by the Distribution Agreement for the remainder of its term and
to allow Plaintiff to remain the exclusive distributor of Squatters' beer through December 14,
2000, the remaining term of the Agreement. (See Amended Complaint, f 63.)
5.

Defendants Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers Cooperative asserted a

counterclaim against Carlson for breach of the Distribution Agreement's best efforts provision.
(See Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim, Iff 59-67.)
6.

Plaintiff asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the Defendants waived their

right to sue Plaintiff for violating the Agreement's best efforts clause. (See Plaintiffs Answer
to Counterclaim, p. 8.)

7.

Early in the case, the Plaintiff sought injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claim for

injunctive relief was important to all the parties and substantial nature and, in fact, was a
significant component in the context of this lawsuit when the case is considered as a whole.
Significant court resources, attorneys' fees and time were expended on this aspect of the case.
8.

By order dated September 27, 2000, the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for

Preliminary Injunction.
9.

After approximately two years of litigation, the trial of this action commenced

on July 30, 2002, and concluded on August 2, 2002.
10.

At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case in chief, Defendants moved for a

directed verdict on Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Violation of Plaintiffs Trademark
Rights in § 10 of the Agreement.
11.

Plaintiff conceded the directed verdict on Count II of the Amended Complaint.

12.

Also at the close of Plaintiffs case in chief, Defendants moved for a directed

verdict on Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of the Utah Beer Industry
Distribution Act (the "Beer Act").
13.

The Court granted Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict on the Beer Act

claim because its application would necessarily be retroactive in violation of

UTAH CODE

ANN., §63-3-3.
14.

Defendants also moved for a directed verdict on Plaintiffs breach of contract

claim for lost profits relating to Defendants' premature termination of the Distribution
Agreement.
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15.

The Court directed a verdict in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs lost profits

breach of contract claim.
16.

The amount of the termination fee, Plaintiffs claims relating to the May 15,

2000 price increase, Plaintiffs affirmative defense of waiver, and Defendants' counterclaim
for breach of the Distribution Agreement's best efforts provisions were submitted to the jury.
17.

At trial, Plaintiff sought recovery from Defendants in excess of $512,000,

which included its claim for lost profits for premature breach of the termination agreement of
$182,000, breach of contract relating to a price increase valued by the Plaintiff in the amount
of approximately $10,000, and the termination fee claim.
18.

The amount of the termination fee claimed by Carlson during the course of this

litigation varied from $351,842.00 to $323,096.00 to $319,952.66 to $309,864.82.
19.

Defendants presented evidence at trial from their expert certified public

accountant that the amount of the termination fee was $294,022.56.
20.

On August 2, 2002, the jury returned its special verdict (1) affixing the

termination fee at the amount claimed by Defendants, $294,022.56; (2) finding that Defendants
did not breach the Distribution Agreement by raising the price of Squatters' beer; (3) finding
that Carlson Distributing breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to use its best efforts
to market and sell Squatters beer; (4) finding that the best efforts claim was not waived by
Defendants; and, (5) awarding damages to Defendants on the best efforts claim in the sum of
$20,990.76.
21.

After trial, both parties filed motions for an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

22.

Paragraph 16(h) of the parties' Distribution Agreement provides for an award of

reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs as follows: "[i]f any action is brought by either party
in respect to its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees and court costs, as determined by the Court."
23.

Plaintiff's net judgment of $273,000.00, after deducting the amount of the

Defendants' best efforts counterclaim judgment, amounts to little over one-half of the amounts
sought by Plaintiff at trial.
24.

The Court finds that the claims that the Plaintiff was unsuccessful on, including

the injunctive relief claim, the trademark claim, the Beer Act claim, all of the Plaintiff's breach
of contract claims, except for the termination fee, and the Defendants' best efforts
counterclaim were important, significant claims. When these claims are considered in the
context of this lawsuit as a whole, and when you take into consideration the significant court
resources, trial, and hearing time, as well as the attorneys' time in terms of preparation, trial
time and hearing time which was expended on this particular case, the only conclusion one
could come to is that the claims Plaintiff was unsuccessful on were, in fact, significant. They
were not minor.
25.

The Court specifically finds that the Plaintiffs net judgment rule victory, while

an important factor, is equal to in quality and significance to Defendants' victories on the
claims that they were successful on in terms of the quality of the respective recoveries by the
parties, the resources expended to accomplish those victories and their significance to the
lawsuit as a whole.
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26.

In this Court's view, neither party is the sole, prevailing party because both

parties won and lost significant claims and issues and when this case is considered as a whole,
their respective victories and losses are equal or substantially equal, resulting in a specific
finding from this Court that neither party is the prevailing party.
27.

Even if the Court were to find, which it specifically does not find, that both

parties were the prevailing parties, because of the factual differences relating to the separate
claims, each party would be entitled to recover fees on only those claims they were successful
on.
28.

Carlson submitted an affidavit of fees requesting recovery of $146,642 relating

to the claims that it contends it prevailed on. In addition, Carlson also made a supplemental
request at the hearing of this matter.
29.

Salt Lake Brewing and Utah Brewers incurred attorneys' fees in this action

through August 19, 2002, in the sum of $144,432.25. Of that amount, the total fees incurred
on claims other than the termination fee was $115,066.89. Salt Lake Brewing Co. and Utah
Brewers Cooperative also submitted a supplemental fee affidavit.
30.

As to both parties' claims for fees, the Court finds that the rates charged are

those customarily charged by comparable firms in this community.
31.

Except as set forth below, the Court also finds that the legal work, as set forth

in the fee affidavits, was substantially performed and was reasonably necessary to prosecute
and defend against the claims asserted.
32.

However, the Court finds that the Carlson's claim for fees of approximately

$146,000, plus the supplemental request, to be excessive and unreasonable because it includes
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fees for issues that the Carlson was unsuccessful on, beyond those issues which merely
naturally overlap.
33.

Further, the Court finds that Carlson's claim that 50% of the attorneys' time

was spent on the termination fee issue, while not made in bad faith, to be incredulous,
particularly when viewed in light of the significance of the other claims lost by Carlson,
including its claim for lost profits for premature breach of the distribution agreement, its
breach of contract claim for increase in price, and the Defendants' best efforts counterclaim
and the injunctive relief request. There is no way that 50% of the necessary time to try this
case was spent on the termination fee issue. It is therefore also reasonable to assume that 50%
of preparation time could not have been spent on the termination fee claim.
34.

The Court does find, however, that the Defendants' claim for fees in the amount

of $115,000, as set forth in the Defendants' affidavit in support of its' motion for an award of
attorneys' fees and costs is more reasonable, conservative and consistently satisfies all of the
factors set forth in the Bracken case. Therefore, if the Court were to find that both parties
prevailed, which it is not finding, the reasonable fees awarded to each of the parties would be
the sum of $115,000.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In granting the Defendants' motion for directed verdict, the Court held that the

Utah Beer Industry Distribution Act (the "Beer Act") did not apply. Therefore, the Court
concludes that there is no basis for Defendants to recover their attorneys' fees under the Beer
Act.
2.

The Distribution Agreement between the parties in this case provides for an

award of reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs to the prevailing party.
3.

In R. T. Nielsen v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court

identified appropriate considerations for determining the prevailing party, which include, but
are not limited to, (i) the contractual language at issue; (ii) the number of claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims brought by the parties; (iii) the importance of the claims relative to
each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and (iv)
the dollar amounts to and awarded in connection with the various claims.
4.

The standard articulated in R. T. Nielsen permits a case by case evaluation by

the trial court and grants it the flexibility to determine whether one, both or neither party may
be considered to have prevailed. Of the factors identified by the Court in R. T. Nielsen, those
numbered (ii) and (iii) are significant in this particular case.
5.

In the Mountain States Broadcasting cases, the court made it clear that the

mechanical application of the net judgment rule is not required, but may be a good place to
begin the analysis. In this case, however, I find the mechanical application of the net judgment
rule to be inappropriate.

6.

Early on, the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was important to all parties

and a substantive and significant component, in the course of the lawsuit, when the case is
considered as a whole. It consumed significant amounts of court, resources, and attorneys'
time and fees. Although the Plaintiff recovered a net judgment of $273,000, after offsetting
the amount of Defendants' best efforts counterclaim judgment, if you in fact calculate the net
judgment in that fashion, it is important to note that in this case the Plaintiff sought $512,000
at trial, and recovered little over one-half of the amount claimed. Defendants' were successful
against a number of claims asserted by the Plaintiff, including a substantial, but novel
unsupported claim for lost net profits in which the Plaintiff contended gross profits equal net
profits, despite the fact that Plaintiff's own testimony was inconsistent with this theory.
Plaintiff valued this claim at $182,000 at trial. Defendants also defended against breach of
contract due to a price increase claim, which Plaintiff sought $10,000 at trial.

Thus, the

Plaintiff sought over $192,000 at trial on claims that the Plaintiff valued even higher prior to
trial. Other claims that the Defendants' prevailed on included the trademark claim and the
Beer Act claim, and in fact, all of the Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, except for the
termination fee claim. In addition, Defendants prevailed on the Plaintiff's argument that they
had waived their right to sue for breach of the contract's best efforts clause.
7.

The Plaintiff was unsuccessful on important and significant claims considering

the context of the lawsuit as a whole. The Court, therefore, concludes that notwithstanding the
net judgment to Plaintiff, regardless of how calculated, this factor is only equal in quality and
significance to Defendants' victories on the claims they were successful on. Considering all of

the relevant factors and the matter as a whole, the Court concludes that neither party is the sole
prevailing party.
8.

For the reasons stated above, because the Court concludes that neither party is

the prevailing party in this action, neither party is entitled to recover any attorneys' fees or
costs incurred herein.
9.

Any finding of fact deemed to be a conclusion of law is incorporated into these

Conclusions of Law.
DATED:

November

Thomas R. Barton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that orrNovembef
2002, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:
John P. Ashton
Thomas R. Barton
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

day of

, 2002, and following entry

thereof, I caused to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, to:
John P. Ashton
Thomas R. Barton
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER

175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

50 West Broadway, Ste 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006

Clerk
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John P. Ashton(0314)
Thomas R. Barton (6827)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

CARLSON DISTRIBUTING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST

vs.
SALT LAKE BREWING, CO., L.C., a
Utah limited liability company, and
UTAH BREWERS COOPERATIVE,
L.C., a Utah limited liability company

Case No. 000906096
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

This matter was tried to a jury over the course of four days, beginning on July 30,
2002. At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in which it awarded
monetary amounts to both Plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company ("Carlson") and
Defendants. Subsequently, Carlson moved for an award of prejudgment interest on the
VEATES
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amount awarded to it by the jury. Defendants opposed Carlson's motion.

After full briefing, Carlson's Motion for Prejudgment Interest came before the
Court for hearing on October 30, 2002. Plaintiff Carlson Distributing Company was
represented by Thomas R. Barton of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Defendants Salt Lake
Brewing Co., L.C. and Utah Brewers Cooperative, L.C. were represented by Scott A.
Call of Anderson & Karrenberg. Based on the written submissions of the parties, the
arguments made at the hearing, the evidence at trial, and good cause appearing therefore,
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS Carlson's Motion for Award of Prejudgment
Interest in substantial part, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement between the parties provides for a

termination fee payable to the Distributor (Carlson) in the event that the Brewer
(Defendants) elects not to renew the Agreement.
2.

In its Complaint, Carlson claimed that it was entitled to such a termination

fee from Defendants.
3.

In their Answer and Counterclaim, Defendants denied liability for such a

termination fee. However, Defendants admitted that if such a fee was owed, the amount
would be $290,617.64.
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4.

Section 4(d) of the Distribution Agreement provides that the termination fee

shall be due "within thirty days from Distributor's payment (if any) and delivery to Brewer
of the amounts and properties required to be paid or delivered under § 4(c) hereof."
5.

Carlson delivered said properties to Defendants shortly after the termination

of the Distribution Agreement.
6.

The amount owed by Carlson to Defendants under Section 4(c) of the

Agreement was $12,992.74.
7.

On January 25, 2001, Carlson deposited $12,992.74 into the Court by

delivering a check, in the same amount and made payable to the Third District Court, to
the Court. Said deposit was accompanied by an affidavit from Richard Carlson, and made
in conjunction with Carlson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated January 25,
2001. In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Carlson contended that its deposit into
Court of the $12,992.74, satisfied its obligation under Section 4(d) of the Agreement.
Carlson properly served copies of the afore-mentioned documents—including a copy of the
check—on the Defendants.
8.

In its opposition to Carlson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

Defendants did not argue that Carlson's deposit into Court failed to satisfy Section 4(d) of
the Agreement.
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9.

Defendants neither objected to such deposit nor requested that the funds be

released, until July 31, 2002.
10.

On June 25, 2001, the parties stipulated that Carlson was entitled to a

termination fee under the terms of the Agreement. However, they also stipulated that
judgment could not be entered because the amount of the fee was contested and further
discovery was necessary.
11.

On July 31, 2002, Defendants moved for a directed verdict on Carlson's

claim for a termination fee and argued that payment of the fee was not due because
Carlson's payment into Court did not comply with Section 4(d) of the Distribution
Agreement.
12.

In a ruling from the bench on August 1, 2002, the Court denied this motion

and held that the Defendants had waived any objection they may have had to Carlson's
deposit of the funds with the Court.
13.

However, the Defendants put on evidence and argued to the jury that no

termination fee was owed because Carlson's deposit into Court did not satisfy Section 4(d)
of the Distribution Agreement. Nevertheless, the Defendants presented evidence that, if
the fee was owed at all, the amount was $294,022.56.
14.

Over the course of the litigation and during the trial itself, Carlson calculated

the termination fee in varying and excessive amounts. Carlson also used a method that
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conflicted with the provisions of the Distribution Agreement, and which resulted in the
Court's exclusion, at trial, of Carlson's evidence of the amount of the termination fee.
Carlson subsequently recalculated the fee, and the resulting amount was admitted into
evidence by the Court. This amount was approximately $309,000.
15.

In its Special Verdict, the jury awarded Carlson $294,022.56 as the

termination fee.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court reaffirms its decision denying the Defendants' Motion for

Directed Verdict, referenced above, on the following grounds:
a. Section 4(d) of the Termination Agreement required Carlson to pay and
deliver $12,992.74 to the Defendants. Once such payment and delivery was made,
Defendants were be obligated to pay the termination fee required by Section 4(d) of the
Agreement.
b. Carlson deposited $12,992.74 into Court on January 25, 2001, and
argued that this act satisfied Section 4(d) of the Agreement. Defendants were aware of the
deposit; they were aware of the terms of Section 4(d); and they were aware of Carlson's
position that the deposit satisfied Section 4(d).
c. Nevertheless, Defendants failed to object to Carlson's deposit and they
did not object to or request that the funds be released to them until July 31, 2002—
YEATES
ZAHLER
I, Suite 900
100 South
ke City
$4111
4-1000

approximately 17 months after the deposit.

d. In the stipulation entered into by the parties, Defendants conceded that
Carlson was entitled to a termination fee under the terms of the Agreement. The parties
stipulated that judgment could not be entered because the amount of the fee was contested
and further discovery was necessary.
e. Given the totality of the circumstances, Defendants intentionally
relinquished their right, under Section 4(d) of the Agreement, to object to Carlson's
deposit of the funds into Court.
f. Defendants' conduct in so doing constitutes waiver, and Defendants'
Motion for Directed Verdict on the basis that Carlson's payment into Court did not satisfy
Section 4(d) of the Agreement, fails as a matter of law.
2.

Based upon the foregoing, effective January 25, 2001, Carlson had satisfied

its obligation, under Section 4(d) of the Agreement, to pay and deliver the $12,992.74
amount.
3.

Payment of the termination fee by Defendants was therefore due on February

24, 2002.
4.

Carlson's damage, as represented by the termination fee, was complete and

fixed no later than February 24, 2002.
5.

The amount of the termination fee was sufficiently subject to calculation and

measurement with reference to facts and figures.
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6.

Carlson is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest on the termination fee

at the rate of 10%, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), from February 24, 2001
through the date of Judgment.
7.

However, as a result of Carlson's own excessive miscalculations, it is only

entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of $290,617.64, which is the amount
admitted to by Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim.
8.

Therefore, prejudgment interest accrues at a rate of $79.62 per day, from

February 24, 2002 through the date of Judgment.
DATED this

day of November, 2002.
COURT:

l
rofeKp|! Medley
strict ftburt Judgfe,

1

Approved as to form:
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attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 2002, I caused to be mailed,

first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Scott A. Call, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
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DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT
This Distribution Agreement is entered into as of December 15, 1994, between CARLSON
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("Distributor") and SALT LAKE BREWING COM
L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("Brewer").
1.

2.

DEFINITIONS
(a)

"Agreement" means this Distribution Agreement.

(b)

"Customer" means a person who may lawfully purchase any of the Products from
Distributor for the purpose of retail sale of the Products to individual consumers.

(c)

"Effective Date" means December 15, 1994.

(d)

"Intellectual Property Rights" means all world-wide patents, patent rights, copyrights,
copyright registrations, trade secrets, trademarks, service marks, trademark and service
mark registrations, goodwill pertaining to trademarks and service marks, and confidential
information.

(e)

"Product(s)" means the beer, ale and lager products manufactured by Brewer and
identified on Attachment A to this Agreement, as such Products may be modified,
discontinued, or supplemented from time to time as contemplated by Section 5(d) below
Initially, Products will be sold to Distributor by the keg only, but Distributor will be
entitled to purchase Products in whatever size container Brewer manufactures for resale
to Customers.

(f)

"Territory" means the Counties of Salt Lake and Tooele; in Summit County, the area
south and east of an imaginary line drawn from the southwest corner of Wyoming to a
point one mile south of Coalville, and from that point west to the County line; Wasatch
County, excluding both sides of Highway 6-50 which includes Soldier Summit; Utah
County, excluding both sides of Highway 6-50 from the Carbon County line to the
Wasatch County line and that area east thereof; and in Davis County, that portion south
of an imaginary line drawn east to west between the County lines at the cross roads
junction of Highways 89 and 106, but not including the junction.

APPOINTMENT OF DISTRIBUTOR
(a)

Appointment of Distributor. Brewer hereby appoints Distributor as its exclusive
distributor for the Products to Customers within the Territory.

(b)

Acceptance by Distributor. The foregoing appointment is subject to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, and Distributor hereby accepts the appointment.
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4.

DURATION
(a)

Initial Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall begin on the Effective Date and
shall continue for an initial term of one (1) year, unless sooner terminated as provided
in Section 4 of this Agreement.

(b)

Extensions. Unless, at least ninety (90) days prior to the end of the initial term or any
renewal term, a party notifies the other party in writing of its election not to renew this
Agreement, then this Agreement shall automatically be extended for successive one (1)
year periods under the same terms and conditions.

TERMINATION
(a)

Termination Upon Failure to Cure Non-Compliance in Accordance with Corrective Action
Plan. Except as provided in subsection (b) below, Brewer may initiate termination in
accordance with procedures specified in this subsection (a) if Distributor fails to comply
with any of its obligations set forth in this Agreement. Brewer shall initiate such
termination by providing written notice to Distributor which shall specify the nature of
Distributor's non-compliance and state the date (not less than ninety days) that this
Agreement shall be terminated. Distributor shall have thirty days from the date of receipt
of such notice in which to submit a plan of corrective action, and an additional sixty days
to cure such non-compliance in accordance with such plan. If Distributor fails to submit
a corrective action plan within said thirty day period, or cure such non-compliance in
accordance with such plan within said additional sixty day period, Brewer shall have the
right to terminate this Agreement thereafter upon ten days' written notice. Brewer shall
have the right to review and approve the corrective action plan, and shall notify
Distributor, in writing, within ten days of receipt thereof, of any objections which Brewer
may have with respect to the corrective action plan, and Distributor shall have an
additional ten days to submit an amended plan for Brewer's approval as aforesaid. The
amended plan shall then be subject to the approval process as outlined above.

(b)

Other Termination Events. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events with
respect to a party to this Agreement, the other party, as its sole right and remedy, may
elect to declare, by written notice to the other party, that the term of this Agreement has
expired as of the date of occurrence of such event:
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(1)

A party has all or a substantial portion of its capital stock or assets
expropriated or attached by any government entity;

(2)

A party is dissolved or liquidated or files a petition in dissolution or
liquidation;

(3)

A party has a petition in dissolution or liquidation filed against it, which
petition is not dismissed within sixty (60) days;

(4)

A party commences any case under the Bankruptcy Code or commences
any other bankruptcy, arrangement, reorganization, receivership,
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custodianship, or similar proceeding under any federal, state, or foreign
law;

(c)

(d)

(5)

A party has commenced against it any case under the Bankruptcy Code
or has commenced against it any other bankruptcy, arrangement,
reorganization, receivership, custodianship, or similar proceeding under
any federal, state, or foreign law which case or other proceeding is not
dismissed within sixty (60) days;

(6)

A party is subject to property attachment, court injunction, or court order
materially affecting its operations or performance under this Agreement;

(7)

A party or any individual owning more than twenty percent (20%) of the
stock or ownership interests in a party is convicted of or pleads guilty to
a felony; or

(8)

A party has had its applicable state or federal licenses revoked or
suspended for more than thirty days.

Effect of Termination. In the event this Agreement terminates, in addition to any other
requirements set forth in this Agreement:
(i)

Distributors appointment as a distributor for the Products shall immediately
terminate and Distributor shall cease all sales and distribution activities;

(ii)

Each party shall promptly pay any amounts due the other hereunder, including
any damages due if the termination is due to the breach of this Agreement by one
of the parties;

(iii)

Distributor shall return to Brewer all saleable, unopened inventory of Products,
and within fifteen (15) days of such return, provided Distributor is not in default.
Brewer shall reimburse Distributor for the purchase price of such inventory paid
by Distributor;

(iv)

Provided Brewer is not in default, Distributor shall return to Brewer any and all
property of Brewer in the possession of Distributor;

(v)

Provided Distributor is not in default, Brewer will refund to Distributor any
deposit previously placed by Distributor with Brewer which has not been applied;
and

(vi)

Distributor shall promptly notify all Customers that it no longer is an
"Authorized Brewer Distributor".

Termination Fee. In the event Brewer elects not to renew the initial term or any
successive one year term of this Agreement under Section 3(b) hereof. Brewer shall pay
to Distributor as liquidated damages and Distributor's sole remedy for such non-renewal
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(except for any additional amounts payable under Section 4(c) hereof), a termination fee
which shall be due within thirty days from Distributor's payment (if any) and delivery
to Brewer of the amounts and property required to be paid or delivered under Section
4(c) hereof. The amount of said termination fee shall be equal to .75 times Distributor's
gross profit realized on the sale of Products during the twelve month period immediately
preceding such notice, but in no event shall such termination fee be less than $25,000.
(e)

5.

Continuing Obligations. All obligations relating to nonuse and nondisclosure of
confidential information, indemnification, and the obligations of Distributor and Brewer
with respect to their respective Intellectual Property Rights will survive termination of
this Agreement for any reason.

LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTMENT
(a)

No Agency. Distributor is an independent contractor and not an agent or employee of
Brewer. Nothing in this Agreement shall give Distributor the right to represent Brewer
legally or to undertake any obligation in Brewer's name or for Brewer, and Distributor
shall always act in its own name and for its own account. Brewer's obligations hereunder
will be limited to Distributor and will not extend to any Customer, any ultimate consumer
of the Products, or any other person claiming through Distributor.

(b)

No Assignment. Distributor may hire employees or other agents to perform its
obligations consistent with the terms and provisions of this Agreement. Distributor shall
not otherwise assign or delegate any of its rights or obligations hereunder, or enter into
any sub-distributor agreements, without the prior written consent of Brewer, which shall
not be unreasonably withheld; provided, however, that (i) Brewer shall be deemed to be
reasonable in withholding consent to an assignment to any transferee which owns,
through itself or one or more affiliates, a controlling interest in a brewery and/or
microbrewery; and (ii) Brewer may make its consent to any such assignment subject to
(a) the transferee's agreement to be bound by this Agreement, and (b) Brewer's receipt
of evidence sufficient to establish that said transferee holds all applicable licenses or
permits and has the financial resources and ability to provide the high level of service and
performance required by this Agreement.

(c)

No Sales Outside Territory or to other Customers. Distributor will not solicit potential
Customers outside the Territory or sell or distribute the Products directly or indirectly
to any geographical area or market other than within the Territory. Distributor shall not
sell or distribute the Products to any customer or consumer other than a Customer.

(d)

Reservation of Right to Change Product, Price. Brewer reserves the unqualified and
unilateral right at any time and from time to time, to (i) change, modify and discontinue
Products described on Attachment A or add additional products to the Products and (ii)
to modify the price list for the Products for purchase by Distributor. Brewer will inform
Distributor in writing of any such changes at least thirty (30) days before the effective
date of any such changes; provided that, if such price change is necessitated by an
increase in the tax applicable to such Products, said change shall be effective upon the
effective date for the increase in the tax. Brewer further reserves the right to manage and
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conduct its business in all respects as Brewer deems appropriate and shall be free at all
times to maintain or alter the formula, ingredients, labeling or packaging of its Products
and to make other decisions with respect to its business.
(e)

No Competing Products. Without the express, written consent of Brewer, which consent
Brewer may withhold in its sole discretion, in consideration of Distributor's appointment
as a distributor under Section 2 above, Distributor shall not, through itself or one or
more affiliates, market, sell or represent other microbrewed beer or ale products in draft
form for sale to Customers or potential Customers in the Territory, other than beer or
ale products which Distributor currently sells and distributes for Rockies Brewing Co.,
unless Distributor is obligated to distribute such products by one of its national
distribution accounts or which are brewed outside the State of Utah. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Distributor may, through itself or one or more affiliates, market, sell or
represent a product type which Brewer does not produce (the "New Product") if
Distributor delivers to Brewer written notice of its intent to distribute the New Product
and Brewer fails to inform Distributor in writing of its intent to produce the New Product
within thirty days from Brewer's receipt of such notice, or Brewer fails to begin
production of the New Product within 75 days from Brewer's receipt of such notice.

(f)

No Misrepresentations. Distributor shall not, at any time, during or after the term of this
Agreement, make any statement, representation, indication or implication that any
Product is different than as specified in Brewer's documentation or other literature
provided by Brewer, or otherwise misrepresent the Product.

ORDERS; TERMS OF PAYMENT
(a)

Purchase Orders. All orders for Products ("Purchase Orders") shall be submitted to
Brewer on a standard purchase order form approved by Brewer or in such other manner
as may be approved by Brewer. Purchase Orders not rejected by Brewer in writing
within seven days shall be deemed accepted. Each Purchase Order, when accepted, shall
constitute a firm and binding contract, governed by this Agreement, and shall be deemed
to incorporate and reaffirm Distributor's representations made herein. Unless otherwise
agreed in writing by both parties, any term contained in a Purchase Order which is
inconsistent with any term or condition of this Agreement shall be of no force or effect.

(b)

Shipping. Brewer shall deliver the Products covered by a Purchase Order to Distributor,
F.O.B. Brewer's brewery at 367 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, in accordance
with the delivery schedule set forth in the accepted Purchase Order. Risk of loss or
damage to the Products shall pass to Distributor upon such delivery. Distributor shall
carry adequate insurance to insure against Distributor's risks upon taking delivery of
Products, as reasonably required by Brewer from time to time, and shall provide Brewer
with proof of such insurance as reasonably requested by Brewer. Brewer shall deliver
the Products to Distributor or its agents only. Distributor shall be solely responsible for
the shipment or delivery of Products to its Customers.
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7.

(c)

Prices to Distributor, Distributor may purchase Products from Brewer in accordance
with Brewer's then current price list, as adjusted from time to time as specified in
Section 5(d) hereof. Initially, the per keg price for any of Brewer's Products is $72,00.
In addition to the per keg price for Products, Distributor will pay Brewer a $12.00 per
keg "cooperage" fee, for each keg of Products purchased by Distributor. Upon return of
the empty keg to Brewer in good condition and repair, reasonable wear and tear
excepted, Distributor shall receive a $12.00 per keg credit. Distributor shall pass the
$12.00 per keg cooperage fee on to its Customers.

(d)

Terms. Distributor shall pay for all Products purchased within fourteen (14) days
following the delivery of the Products to Distributor.

(e)

Payments. All payments net of credits shall be made to Brewer in such form as Brewer
may specify.

(0

Taxes and other Charges. Brewer will pay all federal and state excise taxes due on the
production of its Products, and all personal property taxes payable with respect to its
kegs.

(g)

Absolutely Net. All amounts to be paid to Brewer hereunder are absolute "net" amounts.

(h)

Handling of Products by Distributor. In order to insure the quality and freshness of
Products sold to Customers and to maintain the good will and reputation of Brewer for
quality Products, Distributor agrees to comply with Brewer's Quality and Handling
Requirements set forth on Attachment B to this Agreement, as such Quality and
Handling Requirements may be modified and supplemented from time to time, upon at
least five (5) days prior written notice to Distributor.

RESERVED ACCOUNTS/CUSTOMERS
Brewer may market the Products to customers and other consumers, including Customers, using
the direct sales personnel of Brewer and Brewer's affiliates; however, all orders from Customers
in the Territory shall be placed through Distributor and filled by Distributor in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Brewer may market, sell and serve
the Products at its brew pubs (and transfer Products between its brew pubs) without any
involvement with or payment to Distributor,

8.

DISTRIBUTOR RESPONSIBILITIES
Throughout the term of this Agreement, Distributor shall:
(a)

Promotion of Products; Conduct of Business. Use its best efforts and resources to sell
and service the Products in the Territory and to promote the sale of Products by
Customers, and to promote and protect the reputation and goodwill of Brewer and its
Products and to conduct the business of Distributor in a professional manner consistent
with the business good standing and reputation of both Distributor and Brewer.
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(b)

Labeling. Require each Customer to resell the Products only under the tradenames,
trademarks, and logos of Brewer, as directed by Brewer from time to time, and in
compliance with the provisions of Section 10 below.

(c)

Use of Point of Sale Products. Have the right to purchase from Brewer for resale to
Customers those point-of-sale products, such as napkins, coasters and other items, as
Brewer may provide from time to time.

(d)

Advertising.
Use its best efforts to coordinate with Brewer a professional and
comprehensive marketing, advertising and promotional plan to sell the Products and to
promote the purchase and sale of the Products by Customers. Distributor shall submit
all proposed advertising to Brewer for Brewer's approval prior to use.

(e)

Use of Logo in Connection with Delivery. Without limiting the general requirements of
Section 8(d) above, allow the placement of Brewer's designated logo, in a form and
location approved by Brewer, on one of its beer distribution trucks throughout the term
of this Agreement. Distributor shall be responsible for painting the base/background and
logo for the truck and pay the costs thereof. The driver of said truck shall wear a
uniform or t-shirt approved by Brewer and bearing Brewer's logo as part of his weekly
uniform rotation while making deliveries. Brewer shall make said uniform or t-shirt
available to Distributor at Brewer's cost.

(f)

Staffing. Ensure that its staff is adequate and competent to promote, sell, and service the
Products.

(g)

Distributor Representative. Appoint a representative who will be. responsible for
facilitating the relationship with Brewer and interface with Brewer in all matters.

(h)

Permits and Licenses. Obtain and continuously maintain all permits and licenses
necessary under federal, state, or local laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances to permit
Distributor to purchase and distribute the Products to Customers, including, without
limitation, a Utah beer wholesaling license as required pursuant to Sections 32A-11-101
et seq., Utah Code Annotated, and shall otherwise comply with all applicable laws, rules,
regulations, and ordinances, including, without limitation, the provisions of the Utah
Alcoholic Beverages Code, Title 32A, Utah Code Annotated (the MUtah ABC"), in the
exercise of its rights and performance of its duties under this Agreement.

(i)

Customer Records. Maintain a complete record of Squatters' Products sold and the prices
at which the Products are sold. Distributor shall make available to Brewer, on a
quarterly basis or other periodic basis acceptable to Brewer, a report showing a listing
of the Customers, Products sold and prices at which Products are sold during the
applicable period.

(j)

Customer Compliance with Applicable Law. Ensure that each Customer has all necessary
licenses and permits required under federal, state and local laws, rules, regulations, and
ordinances to purchase, resell and serve the Products.
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(k)

9.

Tap and Line Cleaning. As necessary, clean all Customer's beer taps and lines to assure
free flow of beer products. Distributor shall not clean taps and lines for any party whose
products Distributor is prohibited from distributing under Section 5(e) hereof, without
Brewer's prior written consent.

BREWER RESPONSIBILITIES
Throughout the term of this Agreement, Brewer shall:

10.

(a)

Delivery of Products. Deliver to Distributor, FOB Brewer's brewery at 367 West 200
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, Products ordered by Distributor pursuant to Section 6(a)
of this Agreement.

(b)

Point of Sale Products. Make available point-of-sale products, such as napkins and
coasters, at such prices as Brewer shall establish from time to time.

(c)

Tap Handles. Supply Distributor with a reasonable number of tap handles for each of
Distributor's Customers, at no initial cost. If the Customer requires any replacement tap
handles, the Customer will be furnished a replacement by Brewer. When the relationship
with a particular Customer ends, Distributor shall use its best efforts to cause the
Customer to return to Brewer the same number of tap handles originally provided by
Brewer for that Customer, in good condition and repair, reasonable wear and tear
excepted.

(d)

Brewer Representative. Appoint a representative who will be responsible for facilitating
the relationship with Distributor and interface with Distributor in all matters.

(e)

Product Liability Insurance. Maintain product liability insurance in an amount not less
than $1,000,000, with an insurer acceptable to Distributor, and shall furnish to
Distributor a certificate of insurance naming Distributor as an additional insured thereon.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(a)

Distributor's and Customers7 Rights. Distributor is hereby granted the non-exclusive,
non-assignable privilege to use, and to permit Customers to use, Brewer's trademarks,
tradenames, and logos designated from time to time by Brewer for such use in connection
with the advertising, distribution, display and sale of the Products; however, Distributor
is not acquiring any proprietary interest whatsoever in any of the trademarks, tradenames,
or logos or other Intellectual Property Rights associated with the Products, other than as
specifically provided in this Agreement. Upon termination of this Agreement, Distributor
shall immediately cease any use of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, and logos.
Distributor acknowledges that Brewer owns and retains all of its rights in such
trademarks, tradenames, logos and other Intellectual Property Rights associated with the
Products and in any goodwill arising out of the marketing efforts performed by
Distributor or any Customer. The rights granted in this Section 10 shall terminate upon
termination of this Agreement. Brewer hereby indemnifies Distributor and holds
Distributor harmless from and against any and all infringement claims asserted by third
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parties against Distributor pertaining to Distributor's use of the trademarks, tradenames
and logos hereunder.
(b)

11.

Prohibited Uses and Restrictions.
(i)

Distributor may not sell or distribute any of the Products other than in the
packaging provided or approved by Brewer or remove identifying marks
provided by Brewer on kegs or other containers of the Products, if any.

(ii)

Distributor agrees to remove all of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, and logos
affixed in any fashion to property owned or controlled by Distributor (including
vehicles, equipment, and office supplies) upon termination of this Agreement or
before leasing, selling or otherwise transferring such property or control thereof
to another person or putting such property to any use not connected with the
distribution of the Products.

(c)

Permitted Uses. Distributor and the Customers may only use the designated trademarks,
tradenames, and logos of Brewer to identify the Products. Such use is subject to
compliance by Distributor and each Customer with Brewer's trademark usage policies as
provided by Brewer to Distributor in writing from time to time. Distributor and each
Customer shall make samples of Distributor's and such Customer's use of Brewer
trademarks, tradenames, and logos available to Brewer upon request. Upon Brewer's
request, Distributor and the Customers will change or discontinue the way in which they
use any of Brewer's trademarks, tradenames, or logos,

(d)

Identification. Distributor may identify itself as an "Exclusive Authorized Brewer
Distributor." Upon termination of this Agreement, Distributor shall immediately cease
to identify itself as an "Exclusive Authorized Brewer Distributor."

LIMITED PRODUCT WARRANTIES
(a)

Warranties. Brewer warrants that all of the Products will be manufactured and packaged
in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations, that Brewer
has all necessary licenses and permits required to manufacture and sell the Products to
Distributor, and that the Products, as packaged and delivered to Distributor, are fit for
human consumption.

(b)

Breach of Warranty. In the event of any breach of the foregoing warranties, Brewer, at
its own expense, will replace the Product with Products that comply with the warranty
obligations. Brewer hereby indemnifies Distributor and holds it harmless from and
against all claims arising from any breach by Brewer of the foregoing warranties.
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12.

ADDITIONAL WARRANTIES.
(a)

(b)

Brewer Warranties. Brewer makes the following representations and warranties, which
are true and correct as of the date hereof and shall be true and correct throughout the
term of this Agreement:
(i)

Brewer is a limited liability company duly organized, validly existing and in good
standing under the laws of the State of Utah and has full power and authority to
own, lease and operate the properties used in its business and to carry on its
business as now being conducted.

(ii)

This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by,
and is the valid and binding obligation of, Brewer. The execution, delivery and
performance of this Agreement by Brewer is in compliance with all applicable
federal, state and local laws or regulations.

(iii)

Brewer is solvent, has assets in excess of its liabilities, is paying its debts as they
become due and does not plan to incur debts in excess of its ability to pay when
due.

Distributor Warranties. Distributor makes the following representations and warranties,
which are true and correct as of the date hereof and shall be true and correct throughout
the term of this Agreement:
Distributor is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing
under the laws of the State of Utah and has full corporate power and authority
to own, lease and operate the. properties used in its business and to carry on its
business as now being conducted.
(ii)

This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by,
and is the valid and binding obligation of, Distributor. The execution, delivery
and performance of this Agreement by Distributor is in compliance with all
applicable federal, state and local laws or regulations.

(iii)

Distributor is solvent, has assets in excess of its liabilities, is paying its debts as
they become due and does not plan to incur debts in excess of its ability to pay
when due.

(iv)

Distributor has all permits and licenses necessary to sell and distribute the
Products in the Territory, including a current Utah beer wholesaling license, and
is in compliance with all requirements relating to such license. The operations
and business of Distributor do not violate the Utah ABC, and Distributor has
never been cited for violation of any provision of the Utah ABC or received any
formal or informal notice or warning of a violation or potential violation of the
Utah ABC.
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13.

INDEMNIFICATION
Distributor shall be exclusively responsible for resolving any claims made against it relating to
the Products and will use its best endeavors to do so. Distributor agrees to indemnify, defend
and hold Brewer harmless for, from and against any claims, damages or litigation cost resulting
from claims based on Distributor's breach of its obligations hereunder. Brewer agrees to
indemnify, defend and hold Distributor harmless for, from and against any claims, damages or
litigation cost resulting from claims based on Brewer's breach of its obligations hereunder.

14.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Unless compelled by legal process or required by applicable law and except as otherwise required
to satisfy the requirements of this Agreement, Brewer and Distributor shall not disclose at any
time, whether during the continuance of this Agreement or after its termination, to any person,
firm or corporation any confidential information (including the terms of this Agreement),
belonging to the other party in any manner whatsoever.

15.

FORCE MAJEURE
Neither party shall be liable to the other for delays in or failure of performance due to causes
beyond such party's reasonable control, or acts of God, acts of civil or military authority,
priorities under governmental authority, fires, floods, epidemics, war, embargo, riots or national
company strikes or other causes beyond the control of the affected party.

16.

GENERAL
(a)

Headings; Construction. Captions and headings are for convenience only and shall not
affect the construction or interpretation of any provisions of this Agreement. All
Attachments to this Agreement are incorporated by reference and are a part hereof.

(b)

Survival of Rights. The rights and obligations of the parties under Sections 4, 10, 11,
13 and 14 of this Agreement, the obligation to pay any amounts owed hereunder, and any
other obligations which logically continue following a termination will survive and
continue after termination of this Agreement, and will bind the parties, their successors
and permitted assigns.

(c)

Amendment. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement can only be modified
by written agreement duly signed by persons authorized to sign agreements on behalf of
Distributor and Brewer.

(d)

Successors and Assigns. This Agreement will inure to the benefit of and be binding upon
the parties hereto and their respective successors and permitted assigns, and not to the
benefit of anyone else. Each party acknowledges that it has read this Agreement,
understands it, and agrees to be bound by its terms and conditions, and that this
Agreement contains the complete and exclusive statement of the entire agreement of both
parties. THIS AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF
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ANY ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT. ALL PRIOR ORAL DISCUSSIONS ARE
MERGED IN THIS AGREEMENT.
(e)

Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by the laws of the United States of
America and the State of Utah, excluding that body of law pertaining to choice of law.
If any provision of this Agreement is found invalid or unenforceable, it will be enforced
to the maximum extent permissible, and the legality and enforceability of the other
provisions of this Agreement will not be affected,

(f)

Notices. All notices or communications will be in writing and given by facsimile
transmission with a copy mailed by first class mail or its equivalent, postage prepaid, or
by personal delivery, at the applicable address shown on the signature page hereof, or
to such other place as the parties hereto from time to time may direct. Notice will be
properly given on the date of facsimile transmission or on the date of delivery, whichever
applies.

(g)

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be
deemed an original, but all of which together will constitute one and the same agreement,
even if the parties have not signed the same counterpart.

(h)

Attorneys' Fees. If any action is brought by either party in respect to its rights under this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs as determined by the court.

(i)

Waivers. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall constitute a waiver
of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver be a continuing
waiver. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, no waiver shall be binding
unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. Either party may waive any
provision of this Agreement intended for its benefit; provided, however, such waiver
shall in no way excuse the other party from the performance of any of its other
obligations under this Agreement.
DISTRIBUTOR:
CARLSON
a Utah co/porai
L
By:
ne:

Address:

Attn:
Fax:
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1864 South 3730 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

(801) 973-9270
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BREWER:
SALT LAKE BREWING CO., L.C..
a Utah limit^dflSabluty^ompany

Name:

Title: '
Address:

Fax:
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375 West 200 South, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attn: Jeff Polychronis
(801) 359-5426
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ATTACHMENT A
Description of Products
Squatter's Hop Head Red
Squatter's Hefeweizen
Such other Products as Brewer may produce from time to time.
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ATTACHMENT B
Quality and Handling Requirements
1.
Distributor shall use all reasonable care and caution when handling kegs, including the
use of Mkeg drop bumpers," when necessary.
2.
Distributor is responsible for rotating Products in and out of its warehouse and at the
customer's location, to insure that no Products are sold to Customers or by Customers to consumers
beyond the expiration date shown on the keg. Products that are past the expiration date shall be disposed
of by Distributor or returned to Brewer for disposal, as may be specified by Brewer. Brewer shall apply
for all tax rebates related to the sale of outdated Products disposed of by Distributor and shall credit such
amounts to Distributor's account.
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CALCULATION OF LOST PROFITS
I.

CARLSON'S SALES TREND FOR JAN-JUNE 2000
a. Full Strength Cases: +8%
b. Packaged Beer: +40%
c. Draft Beer:-20.53%

II.

PROJECTED SALES AND PROFITS FOR 7/1/2000 - 12/31/2000
a. Full Strength Cases (1999=1403): 1515 @ $3.61
b. Packaged Beer (1999 = 25,270)
25,190 6-pack cases @ $5.59
10,188 12-pack cases @ $5.45
c. Draft (1999=2928) 2,327 @ $27.50
TOTAL

III.

IV.

V.

$5,469.15
140,812.10
55,524.60
63.992.50
$265,798.35

ESTIMATED LOST PROFITS FOR 8/1/2000 - 12/14/2000
Lost profit per month = $44299.73 x 4.5 months
LESS PROFITS ON SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
a. Boulder Draft Beer: 52 kegs @ 27.00
b. Park City Draft Beer
307 kegs @ $24.00
89 mini-kegs @ $10.00
c. Moab Draft Beer
232 kegs @ $23.75
174 mini-kegs @ $9.95
TOTAL
TOTAL LOST PROFIT

$199,348.50

$1,404.00
7,368.00
890.00
5,510.00
1,731.00
($16,903.10)
ft

187. 444.50
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32A-lla-101

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT

tained, or preserved by this title or the rules of the commission for the
purpose of deceiving the commission or the department, or any of their
officials or employees, is subject to the immediate suspension or revocation
of the beer wholesaling license and possible criminal prosecution under
Chapter 12, Criminal Offenses.
(g) A licensee may not assign or transfer its license unless the assignment or transfer is done in accordance with the commission rules and after
written consent has been given by the commission.
(h) A licensee may not sell or distribute any alcoholic beverage that is
not clearly labeled in a manner reasonably calculated to put the public on
notice that the beverage is an alcoholic beverage. The beverage shall bear
the label "alcoholic beverage" or a manufacturer's label which hi common
usage apprises the general public that the beverage contains alcohol.
(2) Failure to comply with the provisions of Subsection (1) may result in
suspension or revocation of the beer wholesaling license or other disciplinary
action taken against individual employees or management personnel of the
licensee.
History: C. 1953, 32A-10-6, e n a c t e d by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 23, § 124; 1991, ch.
132, § 36; 1994, ch. 88, § 10; 2000, ch. 1, § 83.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, in Subsection dXf)
substituted "commission or the department" for
"commission, council, or department" and
added "Criminal Offenses."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288, 214 R2d 888
Authorized p u r c h a s e r s .
Wholesalers may sell light beer only to li- (1950) (decided under former law).
censed dealers; they cannot sell to consumers.
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32A-lla-101. Title — Legislative intent.
(1) This chapter shall be known as the "Utah Beer Industry Distribution
Act."
(2) (a) It is the policy of the Legislature to regulate and control the
importation, sale, and distribution of beer within the state in the exercise
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of its powers under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and pursuant to the U t a h Constitution.
(b) In furtherance of the policy described in Subsection (2)(a), this
chapter is enacted to:
(i) promote good faith and fair dealing in the business relationships
between suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers of beer; and
(ii) provide for the establishment and maintenance of an orderly
system for the distribution of beer in accordance with the laws of the
state regulating the sale and distribution of beer to the public.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-101, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

32A-lla-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affected party" means a supplier or wholesaler who is a party to a
distributorship agreement that a terminating party seeks to terminate or
not renew.
(2) (a) "Distributorship agreement" means any written contract, agreement, or arrangement between a supplier and a wholesaler p u r s u a n t
to which the wholesaler has the right to purchase, resell, and
distribute in a designated geographical area any brand of beer
manufactured, imported, or distributed by the supplier.
(b) A separate agreement between a supplier and a wholesaler t h a t
relates to the relationship between the supplier and the wholesaler or
t h e duties of either of them under a distributorship agreement is
considered to be part of the distributorship agreement for purposes of
this chapter.
(c) A distributorship agreement may be for a definite or indefinite
period.
(3) "Good cause" means the material failure by a supplier or a wholesaler to comply with an essential, reasonable, and lawful requirement
imposed by a distributorship agreement if the failure occurs after the
supplier or wholesaler acting in good faith provides notice of deficiency
and an opportunity to correct in accordance with Sections 32A-lla-103
and 32A-lla-104.
(4) "Good faith" is as defined in Section 70A-2-103.
(5) "Retailer" means a person subject to license under Chapter 10, Beer
Retailer Licenses.
(6) "Sales territory" means the geographic area of distribution and sale
responsibility designated by a distributorship agreement.
(7) "Supplier," notwithstanding Section 32A-1-105, means a brewer or
other person who sells beer to a wholesaler for resale in this state.
(8) "Terminating party" means a supplier or wholesaler who:
(a) is a party to a distributorship agreement;, and
(b) seeks to terminate or not renew the distributorship agreement.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-102, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 2; 2000, ch. 1, § 84.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sec-

tion 32A-1-105" for "Section 32A-1-107" in Subsection (7).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.
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32A-lla-103. Termination of distributorship agreements,
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) or (3), a supplier or wholesaler may
not:
(a) terminate a distributorship agreement; or
(b) fail to renew a distributorship agreement.
(2) A supplier or wholesaler may take an action prohibited by Section (1) if:
(a) the supplier or wholesaler has good cause for the action; and
(b) if notification is required by Section 32A-lla-104:
(i) the terminating party provides the affected party prior notification in accordance with Section 32A-lla-104; and
(ii) the affected party has not eliminated the reasons specified in
the notification as the reasons for the action within 90 days after the
date the notification is mailed in accordance with Section 32A-lla104.
(3) A supplier may terminate or not renew a distributorship agreement if:
(a) the supplier gives the wholesaler 30 days written notice before
termination or nonrenewal;
(b) the supplier discontinues production or discontinues distribution
throughout the state of all brands of beer sold by the supplier to the
wholesaler; and
(c) the termination or nonrenewal does not violate the distributorship
agreement.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-103, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

32A-lla-104. Notice of termination.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a terminating party may not take
an action described in Subsection 32A- 11a-103(1) unless the terminating party
provides prior notification in accordance with Subsection (2) to the affected
party.
(2) The notification required under Subsection (1) shall:
(a) be in writing;
(b) be mailed by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the
affected party not less than 90 days before the date on which the
distributorship agreement will be terminated or not renewed;
(c) state the intention to terminate or not renew;
(d) state the reasons for the termination or nonrenewal; and
(e) state the date, not less than 90 days from the date of mailing, on
which the termination or nonrenewal shall take effect if the reasons for
the action are not eliminated by that date.
(3) A supplier or wholesaler may take an action described in Subsection
32A-lla-103(l) without furnishing any prior notification if:
(a) the affected party is insolvent, bankrupt, in dissolution, or in
liquidation;
(b) the affected party makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors
or similar disposition of substantially all of the assets of the affected
party's business;
(c) the affected party or a person owning more than 10% of the stock or
other ownership interest in the affected party:
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(i) is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or pleads no contest to a felony
under the laws of the United States or this state that in the
reasonable, good faith judgment of the terminating party materially
and adversely affects the good will or business of the terminating
party;
(ii) has its license or permit revoked or suspended for a period of 31
days or more; or
(iii) engages in intentional fraudulent conduct in its dealings with
the terminating party that in the reasonable, good faith judgment of
the terminating party materially and adversely affects the good will
or business of the terminating party.
(4) Subsection (3)(c)(iii) does not apply to conduct by a non-owner employee
or representative of the affected party if the conduct occurred without the prior
knowledge or consent of an owner of the affected party
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(c)(i), a supplier may not take an action
under Subsection (3)(c)(i) because of a conviction or plea by an owner of the
affected party, if:
(a) any other approved owner of the affected party purchases the
ownership interest of the offending owner;
(b) the offending owner was not materially involved in the management
of the affected party; and
(c) the purchase described in Subsection (5)(a) is completed within 90
days after the conviction or plea.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-104, enacted by
L. 3998, ch. 328, § 4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

32A-lla-105. Prohibited conduct of supplier.
(1) A supplier may not:
(a) induce, coerce, or attempt to induce or coerce, any wholesaler to
engage in any illegal act or course of conduct;
(b) impose a requirement that is discriminatory by its terms or in the
methods of enforcement as compared to requirements imposed by the
supplier on similarly situated wholesalers;
(c) prohibit a wholesaler from selling the product of any other supplier;
(d) fix or maintain the price at which a wholesaler may resell beer;
(e) fail to execute with each wholesaler of its brands a written distributorship agreement;
(f) require any wholesaler to accept delivery of any beer or any other
item that is not voluntarily ordered by the wholesaler;
(g) restrict or inhibit, directly or indirectly, the right of a wholesaler to
participate in an organization representing interests of wholesalers for
any lawful purpose;
(h) require a wholesaler to participate in or contribute to any local,
regional, or national advertising fund or other promotional activity that:
(i) is not used for advertising or promotional activities in the
wholesaler's sales territory; or
(ii) would require contributions by the wholesaler in excess of the
amounts specified in the distributorship agreement;
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(i) retaliate against a wholesaler that files a complaint with the
department or the applicable federal agency regarding an alleged violation
by the supplier of a state or federal law or administrative rule;
(j) require without good cause any change in the manager of a wholesaler who has previously been approved by the supplier;
(k) if a wholesaler changes its approved manager, prohibit the change
unless the new manager fails to meet the reasonable standards for
similarly situated wholesalers of the supplier as stated in the distributorship agreement; or
(1) refuse to deliver beer products covered by a distributorship agreement to the wholesaler:
(i) in reasonable quantities; and
(iij within a reasonable time after receipt of the wholesaler's order.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1X1), the supplier may refuse to deliver
products if the refusal is due to:
(a) the wholesaler's failure to pay the supplier pursuant to the distributorship agreement;
(b) an unforeseeable event beyond the supplier's control;
(c) a work stoppage or delay due to a strike or labor problem;
(d) a bona fide shortage of materials; or
(e) a freight embargo.
History: C. 1953,32A-lla-105. enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 5.
*

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998

32A-lla-106. Prohibited conduct of wholesaler,
(1) A wholesaler may not:
(a) induce, coerce, or attempt to induce or coerce, any retailer to engage
in any illegal act or course of conduct;
(b) impose a requirement that is discriminatory by its terms or in the
methods of enforcement as compared to requirements imposed by the
wholesaler on similarly situated retailers;
(c) prohibit a retailer from selling the product of any other wholesaler,
(d) fix or maintain the price at which a retailer may resell beer;
(e) require any retailer to accept delivery of any beer or any other item
that is not voluntarily ordered by the retailer;
({) restrict or inhibit, directly or indirectly, the right of a retailer to
participate in an organization representing interests of retailers for any
lawful purpose;
(g) require a retailer to participate in or contribute to any local,
regional, or national advertising fund or other promotional activity;
(h) retaliate against a retailer that files a complaint with the department or the applicable federal agency regarding an alleged violation by the
wholesaler of a state or federal law or administrative rule;
(i) refuse to deliver beer products carried by the wholesaler to a
properly licensed retailer who resides wTithin the wholesaler's sales
territory:
(i) in reasonable quantities; and
(ii) within a reasonable time after receipt of the retailer's order.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(i), the wholesaler may refuse to deliver
products if the refusal is clue to:
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(a) the retailer's failure to pay the wholesaler pursuant to Subsection
32A-12-603U7);
(b) an unforeseeable event beyond the wholesaler's control;
(c) a work stoppage or delay due to a strike or labor problem;
(d) a bona fide shortage of materials; or
(e) a freight embargo.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-106, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 6.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

32A-lla-107. Sale or transfer of business assets or ownership.
(1) Without the prior written approval of a sale or transfer by the supplier:
(a) a wholesaler may not sell or transfer its business, or any portion of
its business, including the distributorship agreement to a successor in
interest; and
(b) the owner of an interest in a wholesaler may not sell or transfer all
or part of the owner's interest in the wholesaler to a successor in interest.
(2) A supplier may not unreasonably withhold or delay its approval of a sale
or transfer, including the wholesaler's rights and obligations under the terms
of the distributorship agreement, if the person to be substituted meets
reasonable standards that are imposed:
(a) by t h e supplier pursuant to the distributorship agreement; and
(b) on other wholesalers of t h a t supplier of the same general class,
taking into account the size and location of the sales territory and market
to be served.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a wholesaler may not assign or transfer
its license in violation of Subsection 32A-ll-106(l)(g),
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-107, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 7.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998

32A-lla-108. Reasonable compensation — Arbitration.
(1) If a supplier violates Section 32A-lla-103 or 32A-lla-107, the supplier
shall be liable to the wholesaler for the laid-in cost of inventory of the affected
brands plus any diminution in the fair market value of the wholesaler^
business with relation to the affected brands. In determining fair market
value, consideration shall be given to all elements of value, including good will
and going concern value.
(2) (a) A distributorship agreement may require that any or all disputes
between a supplier and a wholesaler be submitted to binding arbitration.
In the absence of an applicable arbitration provision in the distributorship
agreement, either the supplier or the wholesaler may request arbitration
if a supplier and a wholesaler are unable to mutually agree on:
(i) whether or not good cause exists for termination or nonrenewal;
(ii) whether or not the supplier unreasonably withheld approval of
a sale or transfer under Section 32A-lla-107; or
(iii) the reasonable compensation to be paid for the value of the
wholesaler's business in accordance with Subsection (1).
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(b) If a supplier or wholesaler requests arbitration under Subsection
(2)Ca) and the other party agrees to submit the matter to arbitration, an
arbitration panel shall be created with the following members:
(i) one member selected by the supplier in a writing delivered to the
wholesaler within ten business days of the date arbitration was
requested under Subsection (2)(a);
(ii) one member selected by the wholesaler in a writing delivered to
the supplier within ten business days of the date arbitration was
requested under Subsection (2)(a); and
(iii) one member selected by the two arbitrators appointed under
Subsections (2)(b)(i) and (ii).
(c) If the arbitrators selected under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) fail to choose a
third arbitrator within ten business days of their selection, a judge of a
district court in the county in which the wholesaler's principal place of
business is located shall select the third arbitrator.
(dj Arbitration costs shall be divided equally between the wholesaler
and the supplier.
(e) The award of the arbitration panel is binding on the parties unless
appealed within 20 days from the date of the award.
(f) Subject to the requirements of this chapter, arbitration and all
proceedings on appeal shall be governed by Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah
Arbitration Act.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-108, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998. ch 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998

32A-lla-109. Sale or transfer of supplier's business.
(1) (a) Asuccessor to a supplier t h a t after July 1,1998, acquires a supplier's
products or brands in this state shall be bound by all of the terms and
conditions of each distributorship agreement with a wholesaler in this
state that was in effect on the date on which the successor received the
assets or rights of the previous supplier.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection d)(a), a successor may contractually
require its wholesalers to:
(i) execute a new distributorship agreement; and
(ii) comply with the successor's operational standards of performance if:
(A) the operational standards of performance are consistent
with this chapter;
(B) the operational standards of performance are uniformly
imposed by the successor on similarly situated wholesalers; and
(C) the successor provides the wholesaler at least one year to:
(I) execute a new distributorship agreement, and
(II) comply with the operational standards of performance.
(2) (a) For purposes of this section, "successor" means a supplier who
obtains the distribution rights of a brand that a wholesaler distributes in
this state pursuant to a distributorship agreement v/ith another supplier
who previously had the distribution rights of the brand.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (2)(a), the successor may obtain the
distribution right:
(i) by any means, including:
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(A) merger;
(B) purchase of corporate shares; or
(C) purchase of assets; and
(ii) from:
(A) a supplier; or
(B) a person acting in an official capacity who is not a supplier
including a nominee, representative, or fiduciary.
History: C. 1953, 32A-lla-109, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 9.

32A-lla-110.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

Judicial remedies.

(1) A supplier or wholesaler who is a party to a distributorship agreement
may maintain a civil action against the supplier or wholesaler in a court of
competent jurisdiction in the county in which the wholesaler's principal place
of business is located if:
(a) the supplier or wholesaler violates this chapter; or
(b) (i) the supplier and wholesaler are not able to mutually agree on
reasonable compensation under Section 32A-lla-108; and
(ii) the parties do not agree to submit the matter to arbitration in
accordance with Section 32A-lla-108 prior to or within 20 days
following service of process on the electing party in the civil action.
(2) (a) The prevailing party in any action under Subsection (1) shall
recover:
(i) actual damages, including the value of the wholesaler's business
as specified in Section 32A-lla-108 if applicable; and
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.
(b) In addition to the amount awarded under Subsection (2)(a), the
court may grant such relief in law or equity as the court determines to be
necessary or appropriate considering the purposes of this chapter.
(3) If either party elects arbitration under Subsection (l)(b)(ii) following
service of process, the civil action is stayed pending a decision by the
arbitration panel.
History: C. 1953,32A-lla-110, enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 10.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

32A-lla-lll. Modifying statutory requirements not permitted.
(1) Nothing in this chapter is intended to restrict the right of a supplier to
contractually require its wholesaler to comply with the supplier's operational
standards of performance that are:
(a) consistent with this chapter; and
(b) uniformly established for its wholesalers according to the supplier's
good faith business judgment.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the requirements of this chapter may
not be modified by agreement.
(3) Any agreement that by its terms modifies the requirements of this
chapter is void and unenforceable to the extent it attempts to modify the
requirements of this chapter.
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History: C. 1953, 3 2 A - l l a - l l l , enacted by
L. 1998, ch. 328, § 11.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1998, ch.
328, § 12 provides: "If any provision of this act,
or the application of any provision to any per-

son or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act is given effect without the
invalid provision or application."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 328, § 13
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.
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